Bad Girls of Art and Law: Abjection, Power, and Sexuality Exceptionalism in (Kara Walker’s) Art and (Janet Halley’s) Law by Davis, Adrienne D
Washington University in St. Louis
Washington University Open Scholarship
Women, Gender & Sexuality Studies Research Women, Gender & Sexuality Studies
6-8-2011
Bad Girls of Art and Law: Abjection, Power, and
Sexuality Exceptionalism in (Kara Walker’s) Art
and ( Janet Halley’s) Law
Adrienne D. Davis
Washington University in St Louis, adriennedavis@wustl.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/wgss
Part of the Legal Studies Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Women, Gender & Sexuality Studies at Washington University Open Scholarship.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Women, Gender & Sexuality Studies Research by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open
Scholarship. For more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Davis, Adrienne D., "Bad Girls of Art and Law: Abjection, Power, and Sexuality Exceptionalism in (Kara Walker’s) Art and ( Janet
Halley’s) Law" (2011). Women, Gender & Sexuality Studies Research. 14.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/wgss/14
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1628726
 
 
 
 
 
LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 
 
PAPER NO. 10-06-09 
 
 
June 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAD GIRLS OF ART AND LAW:  
ABJECTION, POWER, AND SEXUALITY EXCEPTIONALISM  
IN (KARA WALKER’S) ART AND (JANET HALLEY’S) LAW 
 
 
by 
 
 
Adrienne D. Davis 
Vice Provost and William M. Van Cleve Professor of Law 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1628726
DAVIS BAD GIRLS OF ART & LAW.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 6/8/2011 9:00 AM 
 
Copyright © 2010 by the Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 
Bad Girls of Art and Law: Abjection, Power, and 
Sexuality Exceptionalism in (Kara Walker’s) Art 
and (Janet Halley’s) Law 
Adrienne D. Davis1
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 
 
102 
I.BAD GIRLS OF ART & LAW ........................................................................... 106 
A. Kara Walker’s Art ........................................................................ 106 
B. Janet Halley’s Law ....................................................................... 115 
C. Common Commitment/Common Critique, or Genealogies 
Against Justice ............................................................................. 123 
II.GENEALOGIES OF ABJECTION ...................................................................... 133 
A. Abjection: Classic & Subversive ................................................. 133 
B. Abjection, Materiality, and Power ............................................... 137 
III.SEXUALITY EXCEPTIONALISM .................................................................... 142 
CONCLUSION: SILHOUETTES OF POWER .......................................................... 153 
                                                          
1. Adrienne D. Davis, Vice Provost and William M. Van Cleve Professor of Law, Washington 
University School of Law. I’d like to thank Maggi Carfield, Mary Anne Case, Kevin Haynes, Emily 
Hughes, Benjy Kahan, Michael Murphy, Jeff Redding, Kerry Rittich, Darren Rosenblum, Laura 
Rosenbury, and Susan Stiritz for invaluable suggestions and comments on this Article.  In particular, 
Susan Appleton, Marc Spindelman, and Rebecca Wanzo not only were excellent readers, but, even 
more, engaged and encouraged this project. Helpful comments also came from participants at Brenda 
Cossman’s University of Toronto Feminist Legal Theory Workshop; Robyn Wiegman and Janet 
Halley’s Taking a Break from Feminism Conference at Harvard Law School; Kevin Haynes and Karla 
Holloway’s Women’s Studies seminar at Duke University; the Conversations for Change Women’s 
Studies Seminar at University of California, Santa Barbara; the Women, Gender, and Sexuality Studies 
Colloquium at Washington University [hereinafter Colloquium]; and a roundtable discussion at the 
Modern Museum of Fort Worth exhibit, Kara Walker: My Complement, My Enemy, My Oppressor, My 
Love, in which my co-panelists, Jason Gillmer and Robert Storr, offered invaluable engagement. Bernita 
Washington provided her standard outstanding and enthusiastic research assistance. Dean Kent Syverud 
and Washington University School of Law provided financial support. Finally, this Article has benefited 
from Janet Halley’s own immeasurable intellectual and personal generosity. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1628726
DAVIS BAD GIRLS OF ART & LAW.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 6/8/2011  9:00 AM 
102 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. XX:NNN 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1997 African-American artist Kara Walker won a MacArthur “genius” 
award. This highly public recognition poured gasoline on the slow burn already 
in progress among members of the senior black art establishment. Walker’s 
métier revives the old silhouette form: she creates life-sized racial caricatures 
engaged in every sexual taboo in the book—sodomy, bestiality, pedophilia, 
scatological sex committed amidst piles of excrement. One aspect of her work 
that has been particularly explosive is that it pokes fun at that greatest of 
American taboos, interracial sex. She parodies fears that have achieved the 
status of myth in both white and black communities, and she does so using as 
her setting that greatest of American interracial sex factories, the antebellum 
plantation. Walker’s response to the conflagration? More irreverence and 
proclamations that injury has become part of black identity: “All black people . 
. . want to be slaves just a little bit.”2
Meanwhile, legal scholar Janet Halley was igniting her own firestorm 
among feminists. Arguing that feminism’s first principle of sex equality might 
be in tension with projects and methodologies centered on sexual liberation, 
Halley invited progressive thinkers to “Take a Break from Feminism.” In a 
series of articles and talks that culminated in a book, she argued that sexual acts 
feminists indict as abuse might be applauded as liberatory according to other 
political scripts. Targeting feminist totems erected at the intersection of sex and 
violence, Halley argued that feminist “wins” may entail substantial losses 
according to “queer” goals and that the losses may outweigh the gains. Given 
her pedigree as an anti-subordination theorist, Halley’s indictment stunned 
many legal feminists, and her refusal to reconcile infuriated some. 
 
Beyond involving bad girls in art and law, what do these two controversies 
have in common? At first glance, not much. The first dispute involves the racial 
politics of censoring high-brow art. (This is not Dogs Playing Poker.) The 
second involves a pretty rarefied academic debate about a supposed fissure 
between feminism and queer theory, two theoretical schools most think to be in 
“collusion,” when “most” think of them at all. Despite these apparent 
differences, this Article seeks to make some connections between the Halley 
and Walker disputes.  It shows that both Walker and Halley reject 
understandings of the interplay of sex, power, and subordination proffered by 
conventional “justice projects”—specifically civil rights’ and feminism’s 
articulations of bodily violence and violation as key modes of racial and gender 
injury and subordination.  Central to both of these justice projects is a relentless 
                                                          
2. MICHAEL D. HARRIS, COLORED PICTURES: RACE AND VISUAL REPRESENTATION 216 (2003). 
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analysis of material economies and how they accumulate and allocate racial 
and gendered power over bodies.  Certainly Walker and Halley are not the first 
to dispute such accounts of injury and identity; yet what distinguishes them is 
that both attempt to ground their theoretical and aesthetic indictments in the 
notion of abjection, or the liberatory potential of suffering, degradation, and 
shame, particularly in sexual contexts. Both seek in abjection an alternative 
conception of bodies and power, one not rooted in civil rights’ and feminism’s 
first principles of equality, anti-subordination, and what Halley calls 
“minoritizing” impulses.3
This Article disputes abjection as a conceptual grounding for Walker’s and 
Halley’s political and theoretical indictments. Abjection is classically 
associated with Julia Kristeva’s work in psychoanalysis, but gained political 
traction in queer theorist Leo Bersani’s call for a subversive sex-based queer 
identity. I contend that Halley’s theoretical invocation of Bersani’s abjection is 
misplaced, and that Walker’s aesthetic claims fall victim to similar 
misreadings. In fact, the Article argues that the theoretical innovations of both 
versions of abjection lie in their engagements with power and identity, their 
interplay with loss, longing, and belonging in Kristeva’s classic iteration and 
with injury, rebellion, and politics in Bersani’s subversive one.  In particular, 
Bersani’s notion of subversive abjection is hopelessly embedded in the very 
sorts of justice projects, identitarian claims, regulatory discourses, and material 
economies of bodies and power that Walker and Halley disavow. And, as I will 
show, feminism’s regulatory discourse of consent looms large in Bersani’s call 
 Through abjection, each offers an alternative account 
of how bodies and power configure human subjectivity, in which consent does 
not play the usual starring role it does in liberal accounts, including many 
feminist ones. If consent is the liberal’s key to sexual pleasure (including, 
crucially, in domination), then by subverting it, Halley and Walker throw our 
entire sexual system up for grabs. For Walker and Halley, the attraction, 
indeed, the “sexiness,” of abjection lies precisely in its dematerialization of 
bodies and power. Both invoke abjection to theorize and imagine the 
manipulation of orifices outside of social relations of power or contexts in 
which bodies are actually found.  In their renderings, abjection is sexy precisely 
because of its apparent disavowal of justice projects and their accompanying 
materialist, identitarian, and regulatory discourses. 
                                                          
3. Ian Halley, Queer Theory by Men, 11 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 7, 25, 29 (2004) [hereinafter 
Halley, Queer Theory by Men]. Halley initially elaborates “minoritizing” identity impulses in her Like 
Race essay, contrasting it with “universalizing ones”: 
If intra-gay identity wars can be roughly described as a tension between universalizing and 
minoritizing and between realist and nominalist understandings, so can disagreements about 
the ontology of racial differences. Minoritizing understandings emerge in ethnic solidarity, 
politics-of-recognition multiculturalist, and nationalist discourses of race; and universalizing 
understandings emerge in integrationist, hybridizing, mestiza, and strong-social-
constructivist models. 
Janet E. Halley, “Like Race” Arguments, in WHAT’S LEFT OF THEORY: NEW WORK ON THE POLITICS OF 
LITERARY THEORY 40, 65 (Judith Butler et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter Halley, “Like Race” Arguments]. 
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for a sex-based queer identity. While their aesthetic and academic invocations 
of abjection are fascinating and provocative, the Article concludes that neither 
Kristeva’s psychoanalytic turn nor Bersani’s political one endorses Halley and 
Walker’s embrace of dematerialized economies of bodies and disavowals of 
anti-subordination projects. 
Halley in particular has fallen prey to what might be thought of as a sort of 
sexuality exceptionalism, a deeply essentialist, almost Freudian, notion of sex 
as sacred, repressed, distinct from other bodily pleasures, and, because she 
views it as in need of liberation, exempt from regulation and distributive justice 
inquiries. (This is all the more odd given Halley’s queer commitments, 
including her professed skepticism about the power feminists attribute to sex.) 
In this rendering, sex floats free of material, background conditions, influences, 
or effects.  In addition, reading Walker and Halley together poses some tough 
questions for Halley. Walker’s commitments are aesthetic; Halley, on the other 
hand, seems to be making regulatory claims about how law should govern. If 
Walker’s representations of the racial power of abjection resonate with so 
many, what does this mean for the scope of Halley’s claims? Are her arguments 
to take a break from justice projects limited to feminism only, or must we 
liberate shameful desire wherever we find it, including making room for the 
sorts of racial desires for humiliation and degradation we find in Walker’s art? 
The Article concludes that Walker and Halley have joined the anti-identitarian 
zeitgeist in a peculiar way: rooting their disavowal projects in abjection, while 
fascinating, embeds them even more deeply in what they are trying to escape: 
investigations of material economies of injury, identity, and power. And, 
importantly for Halley, it may undermine her professed goal of liberating 
shameful sex, instead leaving her susceptible to what I will characterize as 
sexuality exceptionalism. 
The Article makes its argument in three steps. First, Section I explores 
Walker’s installations and Halley’s writings to show how each rejects 
conventional justice projects’ investigations of material economies of bodies, 
injury, and power (especially sexual power) and accompanying discourses of 
regulation and anti-subordination. Instead, both claim an alternative genealogy 
of bodies and power rooted in the liberatory potential of abjection. Next, 
Section II argues that their mutual embrace of abjection, while intriguing and 
provocative, in the end fails to offer theoretical and political support for their 
claims. Walker and Halley both reject justice projects that seek to counter 
subordination and injury through egalitarian, regulated social relations, 
including sexual ones. Yet, the Article argues that the theoretical innovations of 
both Kristeva’s classic abjection and Bersani’s subversive abjection lie in their 
analyses of power, including identitarian and materialist considerations very 
much akin to those Walker and Halley are trying to escape. In particular, 
consent and anti-subordination lie at the heart of Is the Rectum a Grave, 
DAVIS BAD GIRLS OF ART & LAW.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 6/8/2011  9:00 AM 
201n] Desktop Publishing Example 105 
Bersani’s germinal abjection text on which Halley heavily relies. In fact, I 
argue that without these conventional justice totems, abjection, to borrow an au 
courant phrase, loses its (subversive) expressive dimensions. Section III turns 
its attention to some meaningful differences between Walker’s and Halley’s 
projects, distinguishing Walker’s aesthetic claims of boredom and racial 
economies of sexualized abjection from Halley’s regulatory claims. This 
Section focuses more on Halley’s project, partly because this is a legal article, 
but also because it is from her regulatory claims that I derive some limits to her 
logic. This Section argues that Halley’s plea for a queer approach to sex may be 
in tension with what I characterize as her sexuality exceptionalism, a rather 
essentialist view of sex as somehow sacred and, unlike other bodily pleasures, 
beyond rational or distributive inquiry or regulation. In her appeals to the left, 
Halley exceptionalizes sex, exempting it from the distributive inquiries to 
which liberals/leftists subject other bodily pleasures (food comes to mind). This 
Section also uses Walker’s scenarios of racial abjection to pose some questions 
about the scope of Halley’s skepticism about justice projects. Finally, the 
Article concludes by giving some attention to the parts of Halley and Walker’s 
representations that seem to agitate their audiences most—their efforts to 
dematerialize bodies while locating them within economies characterized by 
the brutality of their power and injury: slave plantations and modern-day rape 
camps. This Article argues that attention to the interplay of sex and power in 
material economies, or sex as a matter of distributive justice, is necessary to 
discern the meaning, and hence the politics and subversive potential, of sexual 
acts. 
Mine is not the first critique to be made of either Walker or Halley.4
                                                          
4. For discussions of Halley, see Robin West, Desperately Seeking a Moralist, 29 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 1 (2006) (responding to Halley’s review of West’s book within broader indictment of queer 
theory); Pamela D. Bridgewater, Review: Splitting the Difference: A Reaction to Janet Halley’s Split 
Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break from Feminism, 19 YALE J.L. & FEM. 259, 260 (2007) 
(criticizing Halley for “fail[ing] to acknowledge the body of resistance projects into which Split 
Decisions fits”); Mary Anne Franks, Book Review, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 257 (2007) (reviewing 
JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM (2007) and 
scrutinizing SPLIT DECISIONS’ claims from the perspective of the critical theory and leftist principles 
Halley herself employs); Jill Marshall, Book Review, 35 J.L. & SOC’Y. 579 (2008) (reviewing 
VANESSA MUNRO, LAW AND POLITICS AT THE PERIMETER: RE-EVALUATING KEY DEBATES IN FEMINIST 
THEORY (2007)); Adam P. Romero, Methodological Descriptions: “Feminist” and “Queer” Legal 
Theories, 19 YALE J.L. & FEM. 227 (2007) (disagreeing with SPLIT DECISIONS’ definitions of feminism 
and contending feminism itself invites the sort of critique Halley calls for); Symposium, Queer Theory, 
Feminism, and the Law, 11 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1 (2004) (diverse essays responding to Queer 
Theory by Men, supra note 
 Other 
critiques, many personal and some ad hominem, have been made of both, 
3); see also Marc Spindelman, Discriminating Pleasures, in DIRECTIONS IN 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004) [hereinafter 
Spindelman, Discriminating Pleasures] (criticizing Halley’s essay that preceded and transitioned into 
the Taking a Break from Feminism project). More generally, Marc Spindelman has been critical of the 
LGBT community’s emphasis on sexual liberty at the expense of rectifying sexual injury. Marc 
Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1615, 1635-36 (2004) [hereinafter 
Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence] (“Advancing their like-straight arguments and drawing attention to 
heterosexuality’s glories, lesbian and gay rights advocates completely avoid[] any serious and engaged 
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especially of Walker.5
I. BAD GIRLS OF ART & LAW 
 What distinguishes this Article, however, is its emphasis 
on their mutual impulse to root their claims about bodies and power in the 
notion of abjection and its conclusion that such a conceptual grounding may 
lead to precisely what they seek to disavow: sexuality exceptionalism. 
A. Kara Walker’s Art 
As noted, a 1997 MacArthur Fellowship put into high gear a controversy 
over a newcomer to the art world, Kara Walker.6  The relatively young Walker 
revitalized a largely archaic art form, the silhouette.7 Popular as both 
inexpensive portraiture and parlor craft in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, silhouettes are cut-outs from solid pieces of paper that 
highlight the subject’s profile features.8 The form dictated the limitations of the 
genre: “[s]ilhouettes require that all the information be contained on the edges 
of the figures,” and hence “[t]he original forms were limited to static profiles 
often drawn from the subject’s shadows cast onto a surface.”9 Representing 
neoclassical revival as well as the new “science” of physiognomy, silhouettes 
were both backward- and forward-looking.10
                                                          
analysis with the existing problems of sexual abuse, whether cross-sex or same-sex . . . .”); see also 
Marc Spindelman, Homosexuality’s Horizon, 54 EMORY L.J. 1361, 1365 (2005) (arguing that “extension 
of marriage rights to lesbians and gay men also raises the possibility that it has effectively enlarged the 
sex-relational terrain on which male sexual privilege . . .  is free to roam”). 
 Most depicted their subjects 
delicately and favorably. 
5. See infra notes 30, 42, 104 and accompanying text. A PBS-sponsored website asked viewers to 
vote on whether it is morally acceptable to publicly display Kara Walker’s art and the films of Nazi 
propagandist Leni Riefenstahl. A higher percentage of viewers voted to display Riefenstahl’s work than 
Walker’s. Mark Reinhardt, The Art of Racial Profiling, in KARA WALKER: NARRATIVES OF A NEGRESS 
108, 120 (Ian Berry et al. eds., 2003). 
6. Opponents sought to have her MacArthur fellowship revoked and had some success in deterring 
museums from showing her work. For instance, Walker’s piece, A Means to an End: A Shadow Drama 
in Five Acts was pulled by the Detroit Institute of the Arts in July 1999. GWENDOLYN DUBOIS SHAW, 
SEEING THE UNSPEAKABLE: THE ART OF KARA WALKER 103-05 (2004). For discussion of the 
controversy, including the letter-writing campaign to have Walker’s MacArthur award revoked, see, for 
example, Robert S. Chang & Adrienne D. Davis, The Adventure(s) of Blackness in Western Culture: An 
Epistolary Exchange on Old and New Identity Wars, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1189, 1202 nn.43-44, 1203 
n.45 (2006). 
7. Walker was twenty-eight when she won the MacArthur grant. See Riché Richardson, Kara 
Walker’s Old South and New Terrors, 25 J. CONTEMP. AFR. ART 48, 50 (2009). Ten years later, at 
thirty-eight, Time Magazine named her one of the one hundred most influential people in the world. Id. 
She also works in other genres, including gouaches, printed texts, and, most recently, animated puppet 
shows crafted from silhouette figures. 
8. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 210-11, 218; see also Michael Corris & Robert Hobbs, Reading Black 
Through White in the Work of Kara Walker, 26 ART HIST. 423, 438-39 (2003); Annette Dixon, A 
Negress Speaks Out: The Art of Kara Walker, in KARA WALKER: PICTURES FROM ANOTHER TIME 11, 
19 (Annette Dixon ed., 2002). 
9. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 211. 
10. Dixon, supra note 8, at 19-20. 
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Walker deployed the genre to substantially different effects. Her silhouettes 
feature multiple life-sized cut-outs made from black paper arranged on blank 
white canvases or walls. Unlike classic silhouettes, which following 
conventional portrait form appear posed, Walker’s updates capture interactive 
bodies in motion, caught unaware, more akin to a contemporary action 
photograph.11 Her installations wrap around museum or gallery walls like a 
mural, with cavorting figures frozen in independent panels, linked by a 
common theme but apparently unaware of each other.12 Several art critics have 
described the black-on-white friezes as having the appearance of “shadow 
dramas.”13 Her stock characters—the slave master and mistress, the 
pickaninny, the old slave, the Confederate soldier, and what Walker alternately 
calls “the Negress” and the “nigger wench”—invoke antebellum Southern 
slavery. Lest the context be unclear, the pieces have titles like The End of Uncle 
Tom and the Grand Allegorical Tableau of Eva in Heaven and Gone: An 
Historical Romance of a Civil War as It Occurred Between the Dusky Thighs of 
One Young Negress and Her Heart. 14
Walker’s installations appear deceptively simple. The only geographic 
references to slavery are backdrops of moss-dripping trees and clouded moons, 
sometimes with idyllic plantation buildings in the far distance. Against these 
odes to nineteenth century sentimentality unfolds Walker’s “racially coded 
 But this ain’t Tara. Or Roots. 
                                                          
11. See generally Anne M. Wagner, Kara Walker: The Black-White Relation, in KARA WALKER: 
NARRATIVES OF A NEGRESS, supra note 5, at 91 (describing how Walker’s work updates silhouette form 
and plays with the idea of authorship). 
12. Several critics have noted that her installations have the appearance of cycloramas. See, e.g., 
HARRIS, supra note 2, at 215. As Walker herself put it:  
 
 Well, from the moment that I got started on these things I imagined that someday they would be put  
 together in a kind of cyclorama. I mean, just like the Cyclorama in Atlanta that goes around in an 
 endless cycle of history locked up in a room, I thought that it would be possible to arrange the 
 silhouettes in such a way that they would make a kind of history painting encompassing the whole 
 room. 
 
SHAW, supra note 6, at 39 (quoting Interview by Alexander Alberro with Kara Walker, 1 INDEX MAG. 
26 (1996), available at http://www.indexmagazine.com/interviews/kara_walker.shtml). 
13. See, e.g., SHAW, supra note 6, at 39-43 (discussing various referents for Walker’s shadow 
dramas, including Jungian psychoanalytic theory and the gothic). Indeed, Walker entitled one of her 
installations A Means to an End: A Shadow Drama in Five Acts. Shaw refers to Walker’s installations as 
“pageants.” Id. at 6 
14. The End of Uncle Tom and the Grand Allegorical Tableau of Eva in Heaven (1995), reprinted 
in PICTURES FROM ANOTHER TIME, supra note 8, at 54-55; Gone: An Historical Romance of Civil War 
as It Occurred Between the Dusky Thighs of a Young Negress And Her Heart (1994), reprinted in 
PICTURES FROM ANOTHER TIME, supra note 8, at 50-51. Between 1994 and 2002 Walker did over twenty 
silhouette wall installations. For a biography of Walker, see SHAW, supra note 6, at 12-18. For a 
descriptive bibliography of her work, see KARA WALKER: MY COMPLEMENT, MY ENEMY, MY 
OPPRESSOR, MY LOVE 384-406 (Philippe Vergne ed., 2007) [hereinafter MY COMPLEMENT]. See also 
PICTURES FROM ANOTHER TIME, supra note 8, at 97-100 (selected list of Walker’s exhibitions, projects, 
and publishing). While most known for her larger installations, Walker also does variations that feature 
smaller silhouettes, single subjects, or different colors and backgrounds. She also works outside of the 
silhouette form altogether. My Complement offers the most comprehensive selection of her work. 
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mayhem.”15 Her figures, posed in discrete encounters, are a postmodern 
pastiche of canonical texts and popular myths of slavery.  In The End of Uncle 
Tom and the Grand Allegorical Tableau of Eva in Heaven, a trio of young 
black women enthusiastically suckle each other while a (black) infant futilely 
grabs for a breast; to the right, Stowe’s heroine, little Eva, wields an axe against 
an innocent black toddler while behind her a younger black girl holds a spike at 
a threateningly sodomizing angle.16 In a 1997 installation, a banjo-playing 
black man with a pair of scissors in his back spurts blood from his mouth while 
a little black girl approaches from behind: will she wind the scissors like a key 
to bring him back to life or will she drive them further into his back?17
And sometimes you get the feeling Walker took one psychoanalysis course 
too many. Her “plantations” are an homage to Freud 101. Swords and sabers 
appear to have minds of their own, seeking sexual orifices at every turn, as do 
carrots, bugles, legs, and even a cloud. Excrement pervades the images: 
everywhere children and adults carelessly trail feces. And something is always, 
always going on beneath those darned hoop skirts. Second pairs of (masculine) 
legs are visible as women perform sentimental poses of courtship toward their 
apparent suitors. (Such a second pair appears ready to interrupt Walker’s 
interpretation of Eliza’s infamous run across the frozen Ohio River while the 
pieces of ice over which she skips now turn out to be the near-submerged head 
of a black man.
 
18
Much noted is how viewers are incorporated into Walker’s installations; 
less so is how Walker plays with the processes of artistic production. She 
strategically recuperates the material production process of the silhouette in 
which the image is cut from a traced projection of the subject. Walker arranges 
her installations such that viewers find their own shadows projected onto the 
walls and interspersed among her figures and scenes. Thus Walker’s viewers 
find themselves projected into her art, not in the typical semiotic way, but as 
visible participants, collapsing conventional boundaries between art and 
audience. 
) Finally, that swan that raped Leda is everywhere, performing 
in-your-face miscegenation, buried up to its substantial white neck in black 
females’ various orifices. 
Even most of her critics seem to concede Walker’s formal skills as an 
artist. Art scholar Michael Harris compliments her draftsmanship as 
                                                          
15. SHAW, supra note 6, at 18. 
16. The End of Uncle Tom and the Grand Allegorical Tableau of Eva in Heaven, supra note 14. Of 
suckling images, one critic asks, “is this onanism, or pederasty, or nurture?” Wagner, supra note 11, at 
98. 
17. Presenting Negro Scenes Drawn Upon My Passage Through the South and Reconfigured for 
the Benefit of Enlightened Audiences Wherever Such May Be Found, By Myself, Missus K.E.B. Walker, 
Colored (1997), reprinted in PICTURES FROM ANOTHER TIME, supra note 8, at 36. 
18. The Means to an End—A Shadow Drama in Five Acts (1995), reprinted in PICTURES FROM 
ANOTHER TIME, supra note 8, at 30-31. 
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“disarmingly subtle.”19 He continues: “The fact that Walker has depicted 
racialized figures in convincing postures attests to her drawing skills.”20
[Her] work engages the question of how one represents race through 
reduced means. It is through outline and shape, and the intervals 
between the shapes, that information is conveyed. With all figures 
shown on black paper, the identity of a figure as black or white can be 
shown only through racially coded profiles.
 And 
yet, this is where Walker’s troubles start. Walker’s challenge is to convey racial 
differentiation and interaction in what is in essence an evacuated form, one that 
takes its meaning solely through its edges and boundaries. (Indeed, race is 
frequently represented through reduced means and often blacks are read as only 
silhouettes, i.e., without regard to content or interiority.) As Annette Dixon puts 
it: 
21
Walker creates racial meaning through exaggerated racial features: the 
profiles sport thick lips and noses, kinky hair, often rendered in spikes or 
“pickaninny” pigtails, big buttocks. Not only their features but their movements 
are coarse, with legs and buttocks jutting out at odd angles and mouths hanging 
open. In contrast, figures coded as “white” are typically shown in more refined 
and delicate postures.
 
22 These are not only silhouettes, but caricatures.23 And 
intriguingly, “[d]espite all the riotous miscegenation occurring in the work, the 
complication of mulatto characters seems to elude this format; recognizable 
contours require physiognomic distinctions that are not as clear as when we are 
talking about one of Archibald Motley, Jr.’s octoroons.”24 Rather, in Walker’s 
work, race appears as an essence and a binary.25
                                                          
19. HARRIS, supra note 
 
2, at 211; see also SHAW, supra note 6, at 18 (“In their deceptive 
simplicity, silhouettes had established themselves as a way that Walker could signify on the racialized 
imagery that had been a challenge to her artistic practice since Atlanta.”); Dixon, supra note 8, at 23 
(noting Walker’s skills as “an extremely versatile artist”). 
20. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 211. 
21. Dixon, supra note 8, at 20. Michael Harris asks, “How do you exaggerate a stereotype, 
something that already is an exaggeration?” HARRIS, supra note 2, at 217. 
22. The contrast is apparent in a tableau, From the Bowels to the Bosom (1996), featuring elements 
of several of Walker’s installations. Reprinted in PICTURES FROM ANOTHER TIME, supra note 8, at 52. 
23. Robert Storr suggests her work is also reminiscent of the grotesque, beautiful and elegant, yet 
horrific in content. Adrienne Davis, Jason Gillmer & Robert Storr, Special Panel Discussion in 
Conjunction with Kara Walker: My Complement, My Enemy, My Oppressor, My Love, MODERN ART 
MUSEUM OF FORT WORTH (September 2008), http://www.themodern.org/mp3/panel_discussion 
_with_Kara_Walker_9.6.08.mp3. 
24. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 211-12. 
25. In Excavated from the Black Heart of a Negress (2002), Walker inverts race by re-assigning 
color. In this set of silhouettes “black” characters are now cut from white paper, and vice versa. This is 
apparent as an inversion only because, crucially, the now “white” characters have the phenotype and 
coarser movements that Walker (and viewers) assign to blacks. Reprinted in MY COMPLEMENT, supra 
note 14, at 332-37. 
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Not surprisingly, Walker’s irreverent representations of bodies and power 
have triggered a contentious debate.26 For a substantial number of viewers, her 
work is reminiscent of minstrelsy rather than the racial redemption that many 
seek in black art (e.g., “Black is Beautiful,” the Black Arts Movement, and 
Négritude).27 Of course, one can read her work as a postmodern riff on the 
silhouette’s obsession with physiognomy and its connections to racism.  
Several art critics (including African-American ones) have done so.28
 
 But 
others simply don’t see those politics, contending to the contrary that any 
subversive elements are outweighed by the offensiveness. Walker’s opponents 
argue that black art has conventionally emphasized black humanity for a 
reason, and it was not simply because black people’s feelings were hurt. They 
point out that the stereotypical images Walker rehabilitates and recycles were 
linked to structural violence, repression, and racial supremacy. A supporter, 
Michael Harris, fears that Walker 
has locked herself into the racial discourse she is attempting to subvert.  
By identifying with slavery, she seems to trivialize it, and this has 
alienated her from preceding generations who have profound 
memories of racial violence and oppression and therefore a deep 
empathy for the crushing and violent consequences of slavery.29
 
 
Hence, the campaigns, the censorship, and the outrage.30
                                                          
26. A good summary of the debate over Walker and her work can be found in SHAW, supra note 
 
6, 
at 114-123. See also HARRIS, supra note 2, at 216-18; Robert F. Reid-Pharr, Black Girl Lost, in 
PICTURES FROM ANOTHER TIME, supra note 8, at 27. 
27. Walker herself characterizes her work in this way. According to Michael Harris, “Walker has 
described her work as a minstrel show, and, like the original shows, her work is rooted in southern 
mythologies and unresolved racial conflict.” HARRIS, supra note 2, at 212.  Hence the discomfort of 
some viewers when Walker describes herself as playing the slave “just a little bit,” apparently one of her 
favorite phrases. 
28. Gwendolyn Shaw is a leader in efforts to rehabilitate and defend Walker’s work. She argues 
that the discomfort with Walker’s work comes from not knowing how to situate oneself against this 
“gothic space.” SHAW, supra note 6, at 39. She goes on, “[i]t is much like comparing Alice Randall’s 
recent satire, The Wind Done Gone, with the book on which it signifies, Margaret Mitchell’s Gone with 
the Wind.” Id.; see also HARRIS, supra note 2, at 222 (“Much of the criticism of Walker’s art seems 
linked to its literal translation.”). 
29. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 216. 
30. The editor of the International Review of African American Art explains that some feel that 
artists such as Walker “are making their reputations and large sums of money off of their own people’s 
suffering, are repeating monotonous themes to exhaustion, and are catering to the most base interests of 
white curators and collectors.” Juliette Bowles, Extreme Times Call for Extreme Heroes, 14 INT. REV. 
AFR.-AM. ART 3, 3 (1997). Michael Harris offers a more measured account: 
 
 It is telling that three of the most recent African American artists to experience a meteoric rise in the 
 American art world at early ages are Jean-Michel Basquiat, Michael Ray Charles, and Kara Walker: 
 artists whose work locates them deeply within white racial perceptions of blackness. This does not 
 diminish, and is not a comment on, the quality of their work. However, I do wish to question the 
 response to the work by many whites in an art apparatus that shows little egalitarian sincerity. 
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And Walker herself has contributed to the interpretation of her work as 
irreverent. She proclaims her boredom with the conventional civil rights 
emphasis on black injury and its rectification. Her caricatures of slavery’s 
violence, racial and sexual degradation are not designed to indict these harms, 
but rather to express her impatience with them: “So much irritating fucking 
truth about [blacks] and our reliance on the old master/slave dialectic to define 
and redefine our selves [sic] and our history. I really started working this way 
because I was so sick of that dialectic of my colored gal experience.”31 Her 
installations continually riff on this rejection of injury and its connection to 
black identity. “All black people . . . want to be slaves just a little bit.  It gives 
people heaping teaspoons of dignity and pride.”32 This disdain for racial dignity 
claims separates Walker from other black artists. Perhaps most controversially, 
she attributes craving injury to being part of black identity: “to be a slave runs 
along the lines of being a better masochist and knowing how to put up with 
things.”33
One distinct and particularly explosive aspect of the controversy is the 
sexual representations of black women, particularly with white men, that 
pervade Walker’s installations. Her most redundant figure is the “sexually 
magnetic Negress” and her younger version, the (female) pickaninny, posed in 
sexually explicit acts.
 
34 Acts designed to shock. Swords and guns, symbols of 
both Confederate militarism and Southern “chivalry,” embody the white 
phallus in several installations. In one panel of The Battle of Atlanta: Being the 
Narrative of a Negress in the Flames of Desire—A Reconstruction, a “negress” 
fellates a limp soldier’s musket while she appears to vaginally sodomize herself 
with a second weapon.35 In another, a Confederate soldier holds a young black 
girl close to his crotch as he marches, appearing to penetrate her, while his 
lifted foot anally sodomizes a young black boy.36
                                                          
HARRIS, supra note 
 The girl arches her back and 
flings her arms back (sexual ecstasy? fright and pain?), while the boy grasps an 
erect carrot situated at his genitalia. In a third panel, a young white boy, his 
playfulness represented by his paper sailor’s hat, jabs his toy sword at the 
2, at 197. For thoughtful discussion of efforts to prevent some of Walker’s 
exhibitions and to revoke her MacArthur grant, see SHAW, supra note 6, at 102-123. 
31. I Hate Being Lion Fodder: An Interview/Conversation via Email Between Darius James and 
Kara Walker, DEUTSCHE BANK MAGAZINE, available at http://dbkunst.medianet.de/dbartmag 
/archiv/02/e/magazin-interview-walker.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2010) [hereinafter A Conversation 
Between Darius James and Kara Walker]. 
32. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 216. Another critic—a “fan” who interprets Walker’s work through 
the lens of Freudian uncanny—even “struggled” with whether to include this quotation, in part because 
it might lead readers to conclude that she is “politically irresponsible.” Reinhardt, supra note 5, at 127. 
33. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 216. 
34. Dixon, supra note 8, at 13. Even finding language to describe the installations becomes a 
problem: some critics render “neutral” descriptions while others characterize the women as the objects 
of sexualized torture and brutal violence. See infra notes 40-47 and accompanying text. 
35. The Battle of Atlanta: Being the Narrative of a Negress in the Flames of Desire—A 
Reconstruction  (1995), reprinted in PICTURES FROM ANOTHER TIME, supra note 8, at 15. 
36. Id. at 56. 
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spread legs of a lifeless black woman tied by her neck to a tree.37 He is a bit off 
balance, and behind him a young white girl appears about to give him the final 
push toward penetration (and murder?). In An Abbreviated Emancipation, a 
little black girl fellates what turns out to be her own tail (or is it a whip?).38 The 
Means to an End—A Shadow Drama in Five Acts starts with a black woman 
carrying around a young white boy, suspended by his lips from her breast. The 
installation ends with a white man wearing Lincoln’s unmistakable hat 
grabbing a lifeless black girl by her neck while his enormous leg moves 
towards her crotch.39
Walker’s defenders argue again from postmodern sensibilities. Walker is 
playing with the “‘psychosocial Legacy’ of southern racism.”
 
40 Or, another 
postmodern trope, self-referentiality and self-reflexivity. In this account, the 
sexually violated women in her installations are Walker herself projected onto 
the backdrop of slavery.41
But to her detractors, these burlesque images of black women and girls are 
among the most offensive aspects of her work.
 Those who endorse this reading of her tableaux cast 
her as re-enacting the trauma of her own early interracial intimacy. In both 
cases, the installations ought not be read literally, but rather function as 
critiques of Walker’s own relationship to race and gender. 
42
                                                          
37. Id. at 57. 
 As numerous black feminists 
38. An Abbreviated Emancipation  (2002), reprinted in PICTURES FROM ANOTHER TIME, supra note 
8, at 21. 
39. Id. at 30-31. 
40. SHAW, supra note 6, at 12. Riché Richardson similarly finds that Walker’s work “bridg[es] art 
and activism” and “visualizes narratives of black rape and abuse that the media persistently denies.” 
Richardson, supra note 7, at 50. 
41. They rely on Walker’s own recounting of her sexual history: 
 
The moment race enters the picture—in interracial relationships even among friends—the whole history 
comes whopping down with it….It’s like a stage set drops down. There are roles to be played. I 
solipsistically went into those roles. I convinced myself that my friends and relations were participating 
in that real drama of imagined history. I could not be certain of anything I was dreaming up. I had never 
felt myself a minority before getting into intimate dating relationships. 
Edgar Allen Beem, On the Cutting Edge or Over the Line? Kara Walker Is Gifted, Angry, and Subjected 
to Criticism for Exploiting Racial Stereotypes in Her Art. The Maine Resident Is Also Soft-Spoken and 
Unsettled by Her Own Success, BOSTON GLOBE MAGAZINE, Dec. 30, 2001, at 16 (quoting Walker). In 
particular, the notion of Walker as traumatized pervades Michael Harris’s extensive discussion of her 
work. HARRIS, supra note 2 passim. 
42. “One of the most disturbing aspects of Kara Walker’s mockery of enslaved black people is the 
gleeful display of so many little and prepubescent black girls being sexually abused or hypersexed.”  
Bowles, supra note 30, at 15. After several descriptions, the article continues: 
 
Maybe it is wiry little pigtails, bandanna-wrapped heads, strong African facial features and 
the plantation setting that distance these girls from the children of viewers who acclaim Kara 
Walker today. The sentiment against the sexual abuse of children is so strong now that it is 
hard to imagine an artist—who realistically and repeatedly depicts the sexual molestation, 
hypersexuality, and bizarre excretory functions of little white girls—receiving the same 
excited praise that Walker gets. 
 
 Id.; see also Arlene R. Keizer, Gone Astray in the Flesh: Kara Walker, Black Women Writers, and 
African American Postmemory, 123 PMLA 1649, 1656 (2008) (“More than any other image Walker 
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have noted, in addition to public discrimination, economic tyranny, political 
repression, and criminal surveillance, whites established dominance over blacks 
through what Angela Davis termed sexual terrorism.43
 
 Slavery, with its culture 
of rape and forced reproduction of black women, embodied the worst aspects of 
sex in the service of racial subordination. Walker’s installations, with their 
conflation of sexual erotics with slavery’s violence, or, even more 
provocatively, obliviousness to sexual subordination and abuse, flaunt this 
brutal and painful history.  One commentator captures their impact: 
 The master may rape his property, but his victim does not hang her head  
 in shame; instead, she looks back over her shoulder to see if her attacker is 
 pleased. In this bizarre and horrific tableau there are no innocent 
 heroines, no loyal retainers, and no one escapes unpunished—not the 
 black paper characters on the white walls, and certainly not the viewer.44
 
 
Arlene Keizer similarly observed, “When others have visually represented 
the rape of enslaved women, an attitude of mourning and outrage appropriate to 
a cultural tragedy has surrounded the image, an attitude in which the woman’s 
resistance (or unequivocal victimization) is a critical element.”45 In contrast, 
“Walker’s work is explicit, playful, grotesque, and deliberately shocking: it is 
emphatically not the work of mourning.”46 The fear is that such depictions 
satisfy “a strong desire for an essentially pornographic depiction of 
interracialism,” reassuring whites of the innocence of their own sexual past.47
Elsewhere I have referred to the reflexive interpretation of white 
male/black female sexual relations through the historical lens of slavery’s 
skewed and brutal power relations as the juridical imperative.
 
48
                                                          
deploys, [these depictions of sexual violence are] the source of the cultural controversy surrounding her 
work.”). 
 In this master 
narrative of structural rape and forced reproduction, sexual interactions 
between this dyad can only be subordinating manifestations of slavery’s racial 
supremacy and political in motivation and effect, that is, designed and executed 
43. ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE & CLASS 24 (1983). 
44. SHAW, supra note 6, at 65. According to Arlene Keizer, the enslaved, raped woman is a 
“conceptual icon” in black studies and black culture. She argues, “Walker has forced it into view,” yet 
“[i]t is an image that many in the black community fervently wish had never been pictorially 
represented.” Keizer, supra note 42, at 1656. 
45. Keizer, supra note 42, at 1656. 
46. Id. 
47. Reid-Pharr, supra note 26, at 33. 
48. Chang & Davis, supra note 6, at 1203-08 (according to the “‘juridical account: interracial 
intimacy between black women and white men has followed, and must always follow, a top-down 
exercise of power. This power is held by men and wielded against black women who may only futilely 
resist victimization. The emphasis is on the distribution of power between the dyad.” Id. at 1203.); 
Adrienne D. Davis, Slavery and Shadow Families: Re-Thinking Interracial Intimacy Regulation  5-7,  
21-29, 63-65 (Aug. 8, 2010) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (urging limits of the juridical 
imperative and arguing instead for attention to background conditions of equality and power that shape 
the social meaning of sexual relationships and intimacy). 
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to oppress. Unlike frequent representation of black male/white female 
relationships as “a revolutionary act,” “in the context of the black arts and black 
power movements, no such rebellious cast could be imagined for black 
women’s relationships with white men.”49 Instead, these sex acts are 
interpreted through a deeply gendered and conservative lens, in which black 
women are the gatekeepers of not only their own chastity and bodies but also of 
the honor and integrity of black communities. Indeed, following the juridical 
imperative, slavery’s sexual dynamics subordinated not only black women, but 
also black men, alienating them from conventional masculinity’s protection of 
women, thereby demoralizing the entire black community. Interestingly, both 
Walker’s detractors and her supporters embrace this reading of history: either 
Walker is condemned for not adhering to it or she is forgiven and understood 
because she lived it.50
It is this view of sex as repressive and subordinating that Walker appears to 
be opposing in her art. Her silhouettes establish boundaries while 
simultaneously inviting their transgression, and apparently reveling in their 
violation. (And, as mentioned, the viewer, too, becomes implicated, violating 
the conventional boundaries between audience and art.) Contrary to the 
juridical imperative, Walker embraces the pleasure possibilities, the liberatory 
potential of degrading, subordinating, and unequal sex.
 
51
                                                          
49. Keizer, supra note 
 In Walker’s 
42, at 1666. Indeed, Keizer observes, “Many in the black community 
experience this suggestion as a profound heresy, a breaking of the last taboo.” Id. Hence “[t]he 
suggestion that such relationships are driven, on the woman’s part, by self-hatred, masochism, and a 
desire to demean black people as a group hovers just below the surface of many of the critiques leveled 
at Walker, Jones, and other black women writers investigating this territory.” Id. at 1667; see also 
Wagner, supra note 11, at 98 (describing unspeakability of such representations for older black artists). 
50. Gwendolyn Shaw and, to a lesser extent, Michael Harris and Riché Richardson, try to 
rehabilitate Walker by reading her art in this way, filling in missing history and theoretical references. 
Although it  
  
 is arguably the most pervasively traumatic, guilt-ridden episode in U.S. history, the experience of 
 African slavery in America, this delineation produces an extraordinary space of psychological 
 projection.  It is a gothic space, belonging to the dark ages of American history, one that is 
 barbarous, rude, uncouth, unpolished, in bad taste, and completely savage, a space made real on the 
  walls of the gallery, in which the present-day viewer comes in contact with magnetic and disturbing 
  specters from a mythical past engaged in an apocryphal and pornographic, unsentimental master- 
 slave dialectic. 
 
SHAW, supra note 6, at 39; see also HARRIS, supra note 2, at 211 (lauding Walker for her “brilliance,” 
“genius,” and “postmodern irony”); Richardson, supra note 7, at 53 (“The persistent and obsessive 
emphasis on the mythical black rapist, which construes black masculinity as pathological, ideologically 
obscures this white masculine sexual obverse, an obverse that Walker’s art has persistently 
acknowledged and magnified.”). 
51. Patricia Yaeger combines a juridical reading of slavery’s sexually “traumatic events” and 
“stolen milk” with an intriguing Freudian interpretation of the silhouettes, comparing Walker’s “riot of 
lactation” with the role of cross-racial and incestuous suckling in Alice Randall’s parody, The Wind 
Done Gone, contending that in both, “milk has the power to initiate new genealogies, unexpected forms 
of rivalry and sisterhood, as well as old forms of capital.” Patricia Yaeger, Circum-Atlantic 
Superabundance: Milk as World-Making in Alice Randall and Kara Walker, 78 AM. LIT. 769, 784 
(2006). Yaeger links “the hyperfolded, tradition-crumpling art of Walker and Randall” to a tradition of 
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portrayals, sex is everything MacKinnon tells us it is, but it’s fun. Or 
uninteresting. 
These are Walker’s fantasy slave plantations, more influenced by Freudian 
repression and postmodern pastiche and parody than nineteenth century 
sentimentality or contemporary Black Pride. (Nat Turner and Gabriel Prosser 
are conspicuously absent and she delights in a Harriet Tubman who cannot 
remember which star is the North Star.52) They are full of mischief and 
mayhem, and no one seems particularly angry or upset about, or even really 
aware of, the rampant debauched violence. Figures always seem to be looking 
the other way as their orifices are penetrated. If classic silhouettes were a nod 
to the artistic and scientific conventions of their time, Walker’s reworked 
versions manifest an unabashed commitment to the irreverence and excess of 
contemporary and postmodern art.53 The power of the images, and the 
controversy over her work, stems from the ambiguity: is Walker reiterating or 
subverting the myths and stereotypes of slavery?54
B. Janet Halley’s Law 
 A master (and mistress) of 
the postmodern, Walker dissembles in her answers. In other words, Kara 
Walker is a bad girl. 
Janet Halley is a widely and highly regarded gender and sexuality theorist.  
Her early work in law indicted legal and political institutions for perpetuating 
heterosexism and repressing same-sex and gender rebellion.55
                                                          
subverting racial legacies through subversive nursing and milk drinking within contemporary black 
fiction, including a plantation mistress’s nursing a black baby in Sherley Anne Williams’s Dessa Rose 
and Milkman Dead’s pre-adolescent suckling in Toni Morrison’s Song of Solomon.  Id. 
 While not 
explicitly feminist in method or claims, Halley’s work was largely applauded 
52. Thelma Golden/Kara Walker: A Dialogue, in PICTURES FROM ANOTHER TIME, supra note 8, at 
43, 49 [hereinafter Thelma Golden/Kara Walker]. Black feminist theorist Michele Wallace compares 
Walker’s silhouettes to the worlds created by Lewis Carroll and J.R.R. Tolkein. Michele Wallace, The 
Enigma of the Negress Kara Walker, in KARA WALKER: NARRATIVES OF A NEGRESS, supra note 5, at 
174, 176. 
53. She violently reworks the silhouette form, contrasting the “‘ugliness’ of slavery and ‘prettiness’ 
of the silhouette.” Reid-Pharr, supra note 26, at 28. Walker herself has argued that, as a “weaker, more 
feminine form,” the silhouette may have been available to nineteenth century black women artists.  
SHAW, supra note 6, at 20. “I often compare my method of working to that of a well-meaning freed 
woman in a Northern state who is attempting to delineate the horrors of Southern slavery but with next 
to no resources, other than some paper and a pen knife and some people she’d like to kill.” Dixon, supra 
note 8, at 11 (quoting Walker). Interestingly, even though machines allowing precision silhouettes date 
back to at least the nineteenth century, Walker works freehand in today’s far more technologically 
sophisticated economy. Thelma Golden/Kara Walker, supra note 52, at 47; see also HARRIS, supra note 
2, at 215 (discussing Walker’s work in context of postmodernism and hip-hop culture). 
54. For instance, Gwendolyn Dubois Shaw notes that The Grand Allegorical Tableau “evoked for 
me the restaging of an apocryphal episode from . . . Uncle Tom’s Cabin. But I also saw piles of 
excrement, children being sexually assaulted, and babies being murdered, elements that didn’t fit in with 
my memory of the book.” SHAW, supra note 6, at 4. 
55. JANET E. HALLEY, DON’T: A READER’S GUIDE TO THE MILITARY ANTI-GAY POLICY (1999); 
Janet Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Armed Forces and “Romer v. Evans,” in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION   (Leonard W. Levy & Kenneth L. Karst eds., 2d ed. 2000). 
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by leading legal feminists and she was seen as a fellow traveler. Then the 
troubles began. In a series of essays, talks, and a book, Halley began to argue 
that we should “Take a Break from Feminism.”56
Halley’s argument proceeds in three steps.  As an initial matter, she offers 
what she describes as a “minimalist definition” of feminism.
 The “we” here was 
progressive types, those whose first principles typically include equality, anti-
subordination, and liberation broadly conceived, but not won by sending in the 
troops and bombs. In other words, the usual suspects among the liberal left in 
law. 
57 While 
acknowledging variance and diversity, she defines all feminisms as sharing 
certain common features.58 First, feminism draws a distinction between M and 
F. “Different feminisms do this differently: some see men and women, some 
see male and female, some see masculine and feminine.”59 Next, as a 
descriptive matter, feminism posits the subordination of F to M, or, as Halley 
succinctly puts it, feminism sees M > F. Then, as a normative matter, feminism 
always carries a brief for F.60 Defending this minimalist definition, Halley 
explains that it “maximizes the range of projects that can be described as 
feminist, and makes it harder to Take a Break from them.”61
                                                          
56. The following essays contain overlapping arguments and are listed in the order I believe readers 
would find most useful in understanding Halley’s argument: Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 
 
3 
(contending that a “queer theory by men” offers an alternative way of thinking about sexuality); Janet 
Halley, Take a Break from Feminism?, in GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Karen Knop ed., 2004) 
[hereinafter Halley, Take a Break from Feminism?] (making a “taking a break from feminism” argument 
in the context of human rights debates); Brenda Cossman et al., Gender, Sexuality, and Power: Is 
Feminist Theory Enough?, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 601, 601-02, 604-17, 635-37 (2003) (exchange 
between Halley, Brenda Cossman, Dan Danielsen, and Tracy Higgins over the merits of “taking a break 
from feminism”) [hereinafter Is Feminist Theory Enough?]; see also Karen Engle et al., Roundtable 
Discussion: Subversive Legal Moments?, 12 TEXAS J. WOMEN & L. 197 (2003) (roundtable discussion 
between Halley and Nathaniel Berman, Adrienne Davis, Karen Engle, Elizabeth Schneider, and Vicki 
Schultz) [hereinafter Subversive Legal Moments?]. Seeds of the argument can also be found in Halley’s 
Sexuality Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW, supra note 4 [hereinafter Halley, 
Sexuality Harassment] and Halley’s introduction with Wendy Brown in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 
(Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002) [hereinafter Brown & Halley, Introduction]. Halley’s book 
SPLIT DECISIONS, supra note 4, captures some of the arguments made in these essays, but not all, so I 
cite directly to her essays to maintain the nuance and subtlety of her critiques. I include citations to the 
book where its arguments are distinct. 
57. Halley, in Is Feminist Theory Enough?, supra note 56, at 604; Halley, Queer Theory by Men, 
supra note 3, at 8; Halley, Take a Break from Feminism?, supra note 56, at 61. 
58. “I think these attributes are noticeable in virtually every form of feminism in the United States 
today . . . .”  Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 8. Elsewhere she says “there are many many 
features of contemporary and historically important feminism that are optional, however much they 
appear to their proponents as indispensable.” Halley, in Is Feminist Theory Enough?, supra note 56, at 
604; Halley, Take a Break from Feminism?, supra note 56, at 61. 
59. Halley, in Is Feminist Theory Enough?, supra note 56, at 604. 
60. Id. at 604. In her last essay, Halley concedes that feminism might turn on a distinction between 
M and F and carry a brief for F without insisting on F’s subordination to M. But, Halley continues: “I 
think if you push hard enough, almost any currently available feminist text will eventually manifest its 
commitment to M > F.”  Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 8 n.3. 
61. Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 7. In the earlier essays, Take a Break from 
Feminism?, Is Feminist Theory Enough?, and particularly, Subversive Legal Moments?, she is pretty 
vehement about the universal indictment of feminism: 
DAVIS BAD GIRLS OF ART & LAW.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 6/8/2011  9:00 AM 
201n] Desktop Publishing Example 117 
Halley’s next step argues for a divergence between feminism’s goals and 
those of queer theory. Within the minimalist architecture she identifies two 
“phyla,” one committed to theorizing F’s subordination through sexuality and 
the other focused on care work.62 Of concern to Halley is the former.63 In its 
activist mode, feminism targeted sexual violence, sexual harassment, sex 
between unequals (Halley’s examples are “boss/secretary, teacher/student”), 
and pornography “as leverage points for the de-subordination of women.”64  
She fears that, in the process, these “feminist justice projects” succumbed to 
governance goals, developing frightening alliances with the state to police and 
discipline undesirable sex.65
                                                          
 
 Halley also fears what she/Ian (Halley’s Queer 
My point today has been that, in those practices, feminism has argued itself into the idea that 
all left anti-subordination justice projects must be feminist—and if they are not, feminists 
have been morally bad. My countermove is to suggest that, we might have stronger 
feminism, and stronger other left justice projects, if, in this practice that is feminism, we were 
more willing to let some projects go and to let some things not be feminist. 
 
Halley, in Subversive Legal Moments?, supra note 56, at 241. In the last essay, Queer Theory by Men, it 
appears her real targets are dominance and cultural feminism: 
 
Our very desire and our very modes of knowledge are inhabited throughout by the 
epistemology of this power structure. Men emerge as objective knowers, and women as 
known objects; and this turns us all on and is our basic grammar of action: man fucks 
woman, subject verb object. Feminism is a project in quest for women’s point of view, 
which, because it is already constituted as its subordination, is not only a profoundly 
deferred but also a deeply problematic starting place. 
 
Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 10; see also Romero, supra note 4, at 233 (“Halley’s real 
problem is with two strands of “sexual-subordination” feminism, not feminism in toto. . . . Halley 
detests the anti-sex culture connected to [MacKinnon] and the moralism that pervades [West].”) 
(footnotes omitted). Yet all of the pieces proclaim equally her commitment to the “minimalist 
definition” of feminism. The Split Decisions monograph incorporates an analysis of more kinds of 
feminisms, but still adheres to the “minimalist” definition. See, e.g., HALLEY, supra note 4, at 4-5, 8, 17-
20, 149, 189, 249, 287, 290, 309-10. The book also introduces another set of feminist minima, the Injury 
Triad, a “triad of descriptive stakes: women are injured, they do not cause any social harm, and men, 
who injure women, are immune from harm—female injury + female innocence + male immunity.” Id. at 
320; cf. West, supra note 4, at 38, 44 (urging that Halley erases rape’s injury, absolves perpetrators of 
responsibility, and denies a role for state or social intervention, which she terms the “legitimation 
triad”). 
62. See, e.g., Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 8-9; see also Adrienne D. Davis & 
Joan C. Williams, Foreword—Symposium: Gender, Work & Family Project Inaugural Feminist Legal 
Theory Lecture, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y  & L. 1, 3 (2000) (“Yet, even as the sex/violence strand 
has become a mainstay of contemporary feminist legal theory, another core piece of anti-sexist analysis 
has been left under-attended. It is the conflict that people experience as they negotiate between their 
work lives and their family lives, especially once complicated by parental status.”). 
63. Halley is now working on comparative family law. See, e.g., Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, 
Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law: Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family Law 
Exceptionalism: Introduction to the Special Issue on Comparative Family Law, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 753 
(2010); Janet Halley, A Tribute from Legal Studies to Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick: Introduction, 33 HARV. 
J.L. & GENDER 309 (2010) (essays from the 2009 Family Law Summer Camp panel “Reconceptualizing 
the Affective Family: A Tribute to Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick”). 
64. Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 13; see also Halley, in Is Feminist Theory 
Enough?, supra note 56, at 608; Halley, Take a Break from Feminism?, supra note 56, at 65. 
65. Halley, in Is Feminist Theory Enough?, supra note 56, at 608. Halley develops this skepticism 
of the left’s alliance with the state in her introduction with Wendy Brown in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT 
CRITIQUE, supra note 56. See also Halley, Sexuality Harassment, supra note 56. In a fascinating close 
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Theory by Men is authored by “Ian Halley”) calls governance feminism’s 
“convergentism,”66 or its desire to integrate and assimilate everything “good” 
into itself,67 leaving it mesmerized by its own “moral perfectionism” and 
unable to hear criticism.68  Feminism’s unapologetic recruitment of state 
power, convergentist impulses, and will to power, to run things, are in need of 
“a theory and practice of its own role in governance, of itself as a responsible 
wielder of power.”69
Understood as a theory of sexuality, one that embodies a “simultaneous 
turn to the state and against sex,” governance feminism threatens to thwart 
other left/liberal sexuality projects.
 
70 Of primary concern to Halley are queer 
projects committed to affirming sex without a first principle of equality or anti-
subordination. Halley’s version of queer theory rejects governance feminism’s 
adherence to certainty, identity, and subordination as guiding principles.71  
Queer theory’s vision of “sexuality [as] dark, unknown to us, riven by paradox 
and reversal” contradicts governance feminism’s commitment to knowing and 
pursuing women’s sexual welfare.72 In fact, Halley argues that feminism’s 
rigorous mapping of sexual injury may actually be injuring its “client base,” 
causing victims of sexism to suffer.73
                                                          
reading of Catharine MacKinnon’s work, she/Ian identifies the emergence of governance impulses as a 
key distinguishing feature between MacKinnon’s earliest work and her classic book, FEMINISM 
UNMODIFIED. “Early MacKinnon” embraced “a critique of the state and of the law. . . . The state could 
not be used against something so constitutive of it as male power; and female subjectivity, which was a 
constitutive element of male power, provided no way out of the dilemma.” Halley, Queer Theory by 
Men, supra note 
 Halley’s queer theory is also rigorously 
3, at 11. But by the time Feminism Unmodified was published in the mid-1980s, 
MacKinnon “claimed to know many, many things.” Id. at 11. The state had a discernible role to play, 
and that was in protecting women from sexual violence, pornography, and sexual harassment through 
imposing legal sanctions and conferring rights. Id. Halley urges that “feminists who want to resist the 
influence of the Late MacKinnon should consider whether their own reasons for resistance appear as 
MacKinnon’s own position” in the early work. Id. at 10. 
66. Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 14. 
67. Halley, in Subversive Legal Moments?, supra note 56, at 225. 
68. Halley, Take a Break From Feminism?, supra note 56, at 66. Halley also refers to this as “big 
tent” feminism.  Halley, in Subversive Legal Moments?, supra note 56, at 225. She rejects efforts by 
self-described feminists to incorporate her criticisms or defend feminism as “recuperative” and part and 
parcel of governance through convergence. Halley, in Is Feminist Theory Enough?, supra note 56, at 
606. Dan Danielsen also offers a brief but insightful comparison of this aspect of Halley’s work with a 
disparate tendency in Brenda Cossman’s. Danielsen, in Is Feminist Theory Enough?, supra note 56, at 
629 (contrasting “containment” versus “big tent” feminisms). 
69. Halley, in Is Feminist Theory Enough?, supra note 56, at 608; see also Subversive Legal 
Moments?, supra  note 56, at 231-33, 236-40 (extensively discussing governance feminism and its 
willingness to induce “sex panics” to achieve its regulatory aims). 
70. Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 13. 
71. Halley’s queer theory borrows from Judith Butler, Michel Foucault, Friedrich Nietzsche, and 
postmodernist thought more generally. 
72. Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 38. 
73. Id. at 12. Describing a woman who sued her husband for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, claiming he coerced her into sadomasochism, Halley contends that, while the woman viewed 
herself as a victim, she was able to use the law, influenced by feminist theory, to exercise control over 
her husband’s sexual preferences. Noting that the court agreed with the wife, Halley argues: “feminism 
might be responsible not only for her power, but also for the terrible suffering that grounds it.” Halley, 
Take a Break from Feminism?, supra note 56, at 75 (emphasis omitted); Janet Halley, The Politics of 
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anti-identitarian, rejecting the distinction between M and F, thus forfeiting 
women as a client base. Finally, it breaks with the “equality-is-freedom” 
impulses of conventional anti-subordination and civil rights movements.74 In its 
place, it permits, even celebrates, the eroticization of domination and its 
liberatory potential.75 A consequence, indeed a goal, of governance feminism is 
to repress through legal sanctions and moral indictments “unequal” sex in the 
name of its client base, women. Hence, Halley fears that queer theory’s 
interests in [affirming] the “intersections of the erotic with power and pain 
might just not always line up under the minimal terms required by feminism 
today . . . .”76
Halley’s final step is to urge that left/liberal/progressives Take a Break 
from Feminism. Instead of urging a reconciliation of feminism with queer 
theory, she argues the conceptual benefits of divergence. “The argument is not 
that the convergence of feminism with queer theory is impossible or 
undesirable; it is merely that divergence is both possible and possibly highly 
valuable.”
 
77 (This is also part of what distinguishes Halley’s project from 
standard queer critiques of feminism that do not urge a full-on “break.”78
                                                          
Injury: A Review of Robin West’s Caring for Justice, 1 UNBOUND 65, 83 (2005) [hereinafter Halley, The 
Politics of Injury] (“While feminism is committed to affirming and identifying itself with female injury, 
it may thereby, unintentionally, intensify it.”); cf. West, supra note 
) 
4, at 18 (“The sense of injury, in 
other words, may well have been brought on, albeit indirectly, by texts, feminist and otherwise. It does 
not follow that the injury itself had its genesis in the Word. The sense of one’s entitlement to equal 
regard, by which one’s suffering might be regarded as injurious, avoidable, deterrable, and compensable, 
though, might well have.”). 
74. Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 38. 
75.  
 
[A]s long as men and women do find intense pleasure inside the eroticization of domination; 
as long as pleasure sometimes takes the form of pain, and pain of pleasure; as long as desire 
can extend its reach to shame; as long as gender as power-over is subject to complex psychic 
reversals; as long as the resulting highly volatile system is understood to provide the raw 
material both for domination and for “resistance, compromise, and opportunism”; as long as 
these conclusions about our life in sexuality hold, it could never be “just ‘the truth’’’ that the 
scenario we are construing was only pleasure/resistance and not something bad as well, or 
only something bad and not pleasure/resistance as well. 
 
Id. at 37-38. 
76. Id. at 49. Acknowledging variations of queer discourse, she seeks a queer theory purged of 
identitarianism and feminist convergence: in other words, a purely Foucauldian dedication to “bodies 
and pleasures.” Id. at 20 (citing Leo Bersani, Is the Rectum a Grave?, in AIDS: CULTURAL 
ANALYSIS/CULTURAL ACTIVISM 197 (Douglas Crimp ed., 1988)). 
77. Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 9-10. “My overall goal in this discussion is to 
make a case for the proposition that divergence in left thinking about sexuality and power can get us 
some conceptual gains that seem unavailable from convergence.” Id. at 9. In fact, as noted above, the 
convergentist impulse is one key feature of governance feminism. See supra notes 66-68 and 
accompanying text. 
78. See, e.g., Cheshire Calhoun, Separating Lesbian Theory from Feminist Theory, 104 ETHICS 558 
(1994); FEMINISM MEETS QUEER THEORY  (Elizabeth Weed & Naomi Schor eds., 1997) (compilation of 
essays addressing “the odd sort of feminism queer theory presents [feminism] with,” which is “a strange 
feminism, stripped of its contentious elements, its internal contradictions, its multiplicity.” Id. at vii, ix.); 
Elisa Glick, Sex Positive: Feminism, Queer Theory, and the Politics of Transgression, 64 FEMINIST 
REV. 19 (discussing how the sexual politics of the 1980s and 1990s permitted a theoretical 
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Taking a Break from Feminism appears to have two components. As a 
descriptive matter, it rejects feminism’s monopoly as a theory of sexuality. 
Halley observes: “[Gayle] Rubin’s hypothesis that a left sex radical could have 
an analysis or a political moment that engages the politics of erotic life without 
being feminist has come to have a significant descriptive validity, at least for 
now.”79 Such a Break leaves room for hypotheses “that sexuality can be 
understood without reference to M and F; and . . . that power can be understood 
without >.”80 The normative component is that there are benefits of suspending 
feminism’s monopoly. Halley compiles an exhaustive list of “costs” that 
governance feminism imposes.81 Of primary concern is its ruthless efforts to 
end the sexual subordination of its client base, women, at the expense of other 
social interests, including queer goals.82 In sum, “we don’t always need 
feminism in order to have meaningful left projects about sexuality.”83
The Taking a Break from Feminism (TBF) essays comprise only one 
strand of Janet Halley’s substantial and complex oeuvre. Some of her germinal 
articles also grappled with tensions between queer commitments and feminism, 
but in those papers she distinguished among different forms of feminism, those 
she found compatible with sexuality justice projects (e.g., socialist feminism 
 
                                                          
alliance between feminism and queer theory on sex positivity); see also infra notes 92, 205, and 
accompanying text (discussing rejection of women queer theorists). 
79. Halley, Take a Break from Feminism?, supra note 56, at 58. Halley quotes Rubin: “Feminism is 
the theory of gender oppression. To automatically assume that this makes it the theory of sexual 
oppression is to fail to distinguish between gender, on the one hand, and erotic desire, on the other.”  Id. 
at 57 (quoting Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, in 
PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 267, 307 (Carol S. Vance ed., 1984)). 
80. Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 47. Her monograph, Split Decisions, is more 
ambivalent about whether queer theory generated by men can offer the refuge from governance and 
equality-seeking Halley envisions.  Halley herself notes the tension within the book: 
 
 I’m not promoting Queer Theory as The Answer, or as The Replacement of Feminism, or as a 
 Normative Ideal.  It has been a brave Break Taker, and it has carried the ball further down 
 certain fields. But it has its own limits . . . . Other people might idealize queer theory—for 
 instance, the Janet Halley who started this book did—but I simply no longer think it’s a good 
 idea to collapse your theory with your utopia. 
 
HALLEY, supra note 4, at 309. On the very next page she reiterates, “My idea that Queer Theory by Men 
would give me a clean break from feminism was promptly defeated by the very texts I selected to 
study.” Id. at 310. 
81. See, e.g., Halley, in Is Feminist Theory Enough?, supra note 56, at 607, 607-11. 
82. Halley is adamant that she is endorsing neither anti-feminism nor post-feminism, which she 
characterizes (and implicitly rejects) as neoconservative. “To say that this is an anti- or post-feminist 
question is to presuppose that ‘we’ are ‘women’—a claim that would be untrue in a very trivial sense if 
‘we’ are ‘gay men and lesbians,’ or ‘black feminist women and progressive black men,’ or ‘the working 
class.’ To insist that Taking a Break from Feminism is anti- or post-feminist is to presuppose that 
feminism will always be the origin and destiny of left politics on sexuality. But that’s exactly what 
Taking a Break from Feminism is challenging.” Halley, Take a Break from Feminism?, supra note 56, at 
59-60 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted); see also Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 
14 (“Taking a Break from Feminism is anti- or post-feminist only if feminism requires convergentism 
on all matters relating to sexuality; that is, if M/F, M>F, and carrying a brief for F must be the ultimate 
ground of all work in this wide and politically, historically, and intellectually riven domain.”). 
83. Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 9. 
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and sex-positive feminism) and those, e.g., “sexual subordination” feminism,84 
that she did not.85
Indeed, feminist queer thinking might even say that we insult women 
by attributing to them such milquetoast psyches that they must be 
assumed incapable of fomenting powerful phantasmatic cathexes on 
abjection. And so we have queer and feminist queer projects of asking 
whether, when a woman claims that a male coworker or supervisor or 
teacher injures her by desiring her sexually, we should believe her, or 
think her claim of injury is reasonable.
  Her characterization in Sexuality Harassment is emblematic: 
86
But the feminism she endorsed in Sexuality Harassment drops 
mysteriously out of the TBF essays.  In fact, what distinguishes the essays is 
that each attributes the “minimalist definition” to feminism, which she argues 
characterizes all feminisms.
 
87 In marked distinction from the earlier work, the 
TBF project rejects all feminisms as intrinsically incompatible with sexual 
liberty goals, now denominated as “queer.” To be fair, she does not consistently 
limit her critique to calls for sex equality: at some points she rejects all 
“minoritizing” civil rights projects.88 Yet it is feminism that is squarely in her 
crosshairs. “Is there . . .  something about the social world, something about 
justice, something about left ambitions, that need not be referred to by 
feminism?”89 And, it is only feminism that she calls for a break from, not 
“justice” more broadly.90
                                                          
84. Halley, Sexuality Harassment, supra note 
 
56, at 194-197; see also HALLEY, supra note 4, at 41. 
85. Halley, Sexuality Harassment, supra note 56, at 81.  For instance, she says “I argue that it is 
time for a return to a socialist feminist understanding of this piece of left legalism. This is in part 
because socialist feminism provides the more germane insights into working women’s lives.” Id. 
Similarly, in a contemporaneous essay, a review of Robin West’s book, Caring for Justice, Halley does 
not make a case for the TBF project, but instead urges feminism to “understand women’s version of 
what Leo Bersani, writing on behalf of gay men, has called ‘gay male love of the cock.’” Halley, The 
Politics of Injury, supra note 73, at 70 (emphasis in the original) (footnote omitted). In this essay, she 
expresses her concern not as a contradiction between feminism and queer theory, but rather as an 
intellectual failing of feminism, insightfully arguing that “a feature that I regard as widely characteristic 
of feminist legal theory today and highly puzzling if not downright inexplicable: a pervasive lack of 
interest in women’s erotic yearning for men and a foreclosure of theoretic space for an affirmation of 
men’s erotic yearning for them.” Id. She continues: “Inside feminism I’ve found affirmations of female 
femininity, female masculinity, and male femininity—but no affirmations of male masculinity.” Id.; see 
also Jane M. Gaines, Sexual Semiosis, 11 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 55, 57 (2004) (noting that 
feminism has generated theories of pleasure but not of excitement). 
86. Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE, supra note 56, at 101 
(emphasis in original). Similarly, she says, “I argue that it is time for a return to a socialist feminist 
understanding of this piece of left legalism. This is in part because socialist feminism provides the more 
germane insights into women’s working lives.” Id. at 81. 
87. This architecture is maintained in her monograph. See supra note 61. 
88. See, e.g., Halley, The Politics of Injury, supra note 73, at 65 (characterizing Robin West’s 
recent book on cultural feminism as exemplary of “other left-multicultural identity-political 
subordination-theory (LMIPST) projects” that share a vision of identity politics as harm); see also 
Halley, “Like Race” Arguments, supra note 3, at 65 (on minoritizing identity projects). 
89. Halley, Take a Break from Feminism?, supra note 56, at 59. 
90. Contrast Halley’s book with Wendy Brown, Left Legalism/Left Critique, in which Halley and 
Brown compile essays “attempting to reinvigorate and revalue the tradition of critique as vital to what 
the intellectual left has to offer” with Halley’s call to “take a break from feminism.” Brown & Halley, 
Introduction, supra note 56, at 4. 
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In her quest for an alternative vision of sexuality and power, in one 
important essay Halley appeared to be rejecting not only feminism, but also the 
germinal queer texts by female scholars such as Eve Sedgwick, Judith Butler, 
and Gayle Rubin.91 Instead, she endorsed a particular brand of queer theory, 
that “authored by men.”92
 
 (In fact, this essay is authored by “Ian” Halley.) It is 
here that Halley finds the relationship between sex and power she seeks. In 
contrast with feminism’s suspicions of “unequal sex,” its insistence on such sex 
as a core aspect of the subordination of its client base, women, and its 
commitment to punish and regulate deviations, Halley finds in male-authored 
queer theory the liberatory possibility of sexual shame and suffering. 
In this queer mode, it is the confrontation of the self with its embodiment, 
with its will to power over and its utter lack of control over that object, the 
body; its pleasurable and frightening ability to wield itself as embodied to 
control the world, and the utter, persistent fragility and reversibility of that 
project (the world against the body, against the self) that is erotic; both  
assertion and dissolution are compellingly familiar, mutually contingent, 
and constantly yielding to one another in the body’s very capacity for 
experience of itself as human; gender is secondary, derivative, and  
(however highly useful as a vocabulary) definitive of exactly nothing in the 
 tremulous project of the self.  Indeed, if the implicit masochism of the 
 orgasmic aim involves a will to be shattered, disoriented, erased, then 
 gender would be one of the things that one lost track of.93
 
 
Significantly, because her embrace of sexual shame is rooted in the release 
that comes from relinquishing power, Queer Theory by Men locates the shame 
in a masculine surrender of sexual dominance, an embrace of abjection which 
lesbians, implicitly, do not enjoy.94
                                                          
91. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 
(1990); EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET (1990); Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: 
Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND DANGER 290 (Carol S. Vance 
ed., 1989). Further examples of women scholars whose work in postmodernist and critical theory is 
often used by early queer scholars include: TERESA DE LAURETIS, ALICE DOESN’T: FEMINISM, 
SEMIOTICS, CINEMA (1984); DIANA FUSS, IDENTIFICATION PAPERS: READINGS ON PSYCHOANALYSIS, 
SEXUALITY, AND CULTURE (1995); LUCE IRIGRAY, SPECULUM OF THE OTHER WOMAN (Gillian C. Gill 
trans., 1985); JULIA KRISTEVA, POWERS OF HORROR: AN ESSAY ON ABJECTION (Leon Roudiez trans., 
1982); MONIQUE WITTIG, LES GUERILLERES (David Le Vay trans., 2007). Halley’s monograph, Split 
Decisions, incorporates an extensive analysis of some of these thinkers, but in a context in which Halley 
is already backing away from queer theory as a theoretical and political refuge from feminism’s 
governance and equality-seeking. HALLEY, supra note 
 In so doing, she implicitly rejects 
lesbianism as failing to embody the satisfaction and fulfillment in surrendering 
4, at 114-18, 133-50. 
92. See Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 14-38. 
93. Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 26. 
94. Cf. Robyn Wiegman, Dear Ian, 11 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 93 (2004) (contending that 
Halley reifies gay men while excluding lesbians as sexual actors and theorists). 
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sexual power.95
Halley’s critics have been only slightly less forgiving than Walker’s. Mary 
Anne Franks’ sharp review concludes, “what Halley seems to be after is not 
mere reinstatement of patriarchy, but patriarchy with a smile—with a stamp of 
(erotic) approval from women” and characterizes Halley’s approach to 
feminism as “paranoid-critical.”
 “Queer theory by men,” on the other hand, embraces the 
humiliation and degradation that feminism condemns as subordinating injury. 
96 A review in Feminist Legal Studies found 
Split Decisions to be a “famously reductive” “taunt” and noted: “It is worth 
pausing for a moment to consider why a scholar of Halley’s sophistication 
would do something as crass as reduce a long and vibrant tradition of 
intellectual and political resistance [feminism] to a slick mathematical 
formula.”97 A different review charged that Halley “revels in the bombastic” 
and has created “caricatures” while failing to proffer “sophisticated and 
nuanced feminist theorizing.”98 Both Robin West’s and Robyn Wiegman’s 
reviews similarly look askance at Halley’s politics.99
C. Common Commitment/Common Critique, or Genealogies Against Justice 
 Moreover, informally, at 
feminist conferences and gatherings, one hears murmurings: “I just don’t get 
it”; “What is she doing?”; “I thought she was a feminist.” The jury is in and, 
like Walker’s ejection from the black art establishment, Halley is out of 
feminism’s vast big tent. She is an official bad girl of law. 
One might object to Walker’s installations and Halley’s invitation to Take 
a Break from Feminism on any number of grounds. Criticisms might start with 
                                                          
95. In her monograph, Split Decisions, Halley engages many more texts, including some authored 
by those who identify as lesbian. See, e.g., HALLEY, supra note 4, at 132-50, 230-37, 246-60 (discussing 
Eve Sedgwick and Judith Butler). 
 The monograph is also more skeptical of the promise of queer theory by men. 
96. Franks, supra note 4, at 259, 262 (“Halley frequently characterizes feminism as paranoid; 
ironically, Halley’s reading of the power of feminism could itself be described as paranoid.”). Franks’ 
scrupulous reading of Split Decisions focuses on and deconstructs the binary she finds Halley erects 
between “undifferentiated, decontextualized, and dehistoricized bodily pleasures” and “the allegedly 
pleasure-killing, paranoid, and moralizing power of feminism.” Id. at 257. At the end of her review, 
Franks concludes, “Halley’s theory does not just ask us to take a break from feminism; it asks us to take 
a break from critical thinking and to embrace a theory that immunizes us from any scrutiny of pleasure.” 
Id. at 267. But, basing her disagreement in a focus on the material, Franks disagrees: “While it is 
certainly Halley’s prerogative to find value in patriarchal norms, there is something intellectually 
dishonest about the implication that her position is somehow less moralizing, less paranoid, or less 
powerful than this Thing Called Feminism.” Id. at 261; see also Lisa Jervis, The Feminist Minima, 24 
WOMEN’S REV. BOOKS 6 (2007) (book review) (also criticizing Halley for failing to take account of 
material conditions of power). 
97. Joanne Conaghan, The Making of a Field or the Building of a Wall? Feminist Legal Studies and 
Law, Gender and Sexuality, 17 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 303, 305 (2009). 
98. Mary Hawkesworth, Book Review, 5 PERSP. ON POL. 609, 609, 610 (2007) (“Halley’s virulent 
condemnation appears to depend upon a hypothetical feminism judged in the context of a counterfactual 
Supreme Court case on the basis of facts not in evidence, a troubling mode of theorizing, to say the 
least.”); see also Jervis, supra note 96, at 6 (“Her take is at once too bloodless to inspire much defensive 
anger and too obscure to sway the general public.”). 
99. See West, supra note 4, at 14-16; Wiegman, supra note 94, at 96. 
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an effort to deny or explain away the disputes, as some art critics try to do with 
Walker.100  Next, one might dismiss as undescriptive their characterizations of 
the “justice projects” they reject.101 Walker caricatures the civil rights 
movement and, although in at least one essay Halley limits her concerns to 
dominance and cultural feminism, her indictment of feminism is relentlessly 
broad-ranging while she embraces only a stunningly narrow slice of queer 
theory.102 Finally, one could castigate them, Walker in particular, for fueling 
the fire. (Walker’s response to the fury and storm against her? An installation 
featuring a little black girl fellating the penis of a lynched black man.103
                                                          
100. Annette Dixon argues that Walker’s interest “is neither the history of American race relations 
nor the physical and psychological damage that has been visited upon (Black) American people, but 
instead the very discursive and aesthetic field that would allow the confusions surrounding her work to 
become so prominent.” Dixon, supra note 
) In a 
less inflammatory way, Halley also has rejected feminist overtures to return to 
the fold and expressed skepticism about feminist and other civil rights “justice 
8, at 28; see also supra notes 41-42, 51, and accompanying 
text (critics arguing Walker does conform to juridical notions of race and sex). Insert sex for race and 
women for black people and this statement is probably equally descriptive of Halley’s work. 
101. In contrast to the cottage industry dedicated to Walker’s work, while there has been much 
grumbling, published critiques of Halley’s argument are only now coming. (This appears to stem in 
some part from Halley’s own reluctance to publish her work until she had fully thought it through.) In 
her exchange with Halley, Brenda Cossman defends the analytic purchase of gender, contending that 
feminism can shed light on dynamics and disputes. Mapping different forms of feminism, she offers 
alternative readings of Halley’s key case. Cossman, in Is Feminist Theory Enough?, supra note 56, at 
619-23 (“Together, sex radical, redistributive, and queer theory feminist readings would dispute and 
disrupt the dominant feminist reading of Twyman. But, each of these readings retains a focus on gender 
as an axis of power, as ‘a primary way of signifying relationships of power.’” Id. at 623.). In addition, 
Robyn Wiegman’s response to Ian Halley questions Queer Theory by Men’s taxonomies of both 
feminism and queer theory, concluding that it confuses the inherent governance of legal feminism with 
“feminism in its traversal of either public political culture or the academy.”  Wiegman, supra note 94, at 
105. 
102. Halley defines dominance feminism as “domination of women through power” and cultural 
feminism as unjust male derogation of women’s traits or points of view or values or experiences through 
male-ascendant normative value judgments. Their solutions are to attack male power versus transvaluing 
values and restorative projects.  In sum, 
 
MacKinnon would like to get men by the balls because she does not believe their minds and 
hearts can follow; whereas cultural feminism has detailed plans for their hearts and minds.  
Cultural feminism is a fighting faith seeking the moral conversion of a little less than half the 
human race. 
 
Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 12; see also Halley, in Is Feminist Theory Enough?, 
supra note 56, at 605 (“Countering MacKinnon’s alliance with some cultural feminists to regulate 
heterosexual eroticism on the assumption that it is a key element in women’s subordination and is 
always . . . bad for women, there have been powerful sex liberationist, sex radical, and more recently 
‘sex positive’ feminisms that understand sexuality to be a domain of ‘pleasure and danger’ to which 
women need untrammelled access.”). For discussion of Halley’s narrow vision of queer theory, see infra 
notes 202-07 and accompanying text. 
103. Yasmil Raymond, MALADIES OF POWER: A KARA WALKER LEXICON 365 fig. 33 (still from 
Kara Walker’s video Testimony: Narrative of a Negress Burdened, available at 
http://media.walkerart.org/pdf/KWlexicon.pdf (2004)). Arlene Keizer notes that black women 
performing oral sex on white men is particularly inflammatory: “If the possibility of desiring white men 
is the most problematic ‘contemporary concern’ shaping postmemorial narratives of slavery, then the 
figure of fellatio, which appears in a surprising number of these works by African American women, is 
their most disturbing image of unruly desire.” Keizer, supra note 42, at 1668. 
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projects.” Both have been dismissed as merely generating and reveling in 
psychosocial dramas lacking in significant theoretical or aesthetic content or 
import. Others have tried to ascertain Halley and Walker’s psychological 
motivations for disavowal, putting them on the couch, as it were.104
Yet, here I want to focus on a different aspect of Walker’s and Halley’s 
common commitment and common critique—their mutual indictment of 
conventional justice projects and the grounding of these indictments in 
alternative genealogies of sex and power rooted in their embrace of 
abjection.
 
105
In classic civil rights and feminist conceptions, bodies, power, and 
subordination run through a defined circuit. Certain bodily relations manifest or 
reinforce group-based power imbalances and should be condemned as 
subordinating. Both projects view sexual relations as particularly vulnerable. 
Indeed, structural subordination, whether racial or sexual, erupts most violently 
and visibly through bodies, leaving its imprints on broken carcasses—whipped, 
battered, lynched, or raped. These racially and sexually injured bodies manifest 
the machinations of material political economies that accumulate and allocate 
power among groups, and much of the historic mission of civil rights and 
feminism has been to investigate, document, and combat these effects. Both 
justice projects advocate egalitarian and regulated social relations, especially in 
sex, as crucial to countering group subordination. 
 
In particular, consent and equality loom large in conventional justice 
projects’ sexual critiques. Both the juridical imperative and dominance 
feminism, which Halley terms sexual subordination feminism, theorize sex as a 
core source of identity injury.106
                                                          
104. An issue of the International Review of African American Art particularly manifests this 
approach. 14 INT. REV. AF.-AM. ART (1997); see also Donald Kuspit, Kara Walker’s Cakewalk, 
available at http://www.artnet.com/Magazine/features/kuspit/kuspit11-4-03.asp (“I am suggesting that 
Walker’s work is much more interesting for what it tells us about her psyche than for its ideology . . . .”). 
For a far more sophisticated psychoanalytic reading of Halley, see Ranjana Khanna, Signatures of the 
Impossible, 11 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 69 (2004). 
 Men maintain power over women and, less 
obviously, whites over blacks, through sexual violence, or the aforementioned 
105. Cf. Spindelman, Discriminating Pleasures, supra note 4 (arguing that queer theory is in need 
of a theory of sexual injury and boundaries); Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence, supra note 4, at 1653-54 
(contrasting the role of consent in sexual harassment and sodomy cases). 
106. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text for discussion of the juridical imperative. 
Dominance feminism is classically associated with Catharine MacKinnon. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. 
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 3 (1987) (“[T]he social relation 
between the sexes is organized so that men may dominate and women must submit and this relation is 
sexual—in fact, is sex.”) (footnote omitted); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST 
THEORY OF THE STATE (1989) (contrasting feminism’s account of male power through sex with 
Marxism’s account of class power through labor); see also Davis & Williams, supra note 62, at 2-3 
(explaining that feminists such as MacKinnon “have shown how the eroticization of dominance 
systematically empowers men, while subordinating women and endangering their lives and bodily 
integrity”). 
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sexual terrorism.107 (Note also the very attribution of identity—as men and 
women and whites and blacks—through these power relations.) Feminists 
prescribe consent as a powerful antidote to sexual injury, even if its precise 
calibration remains in dispute.108 In addition, reciprocal and egalitarian sexual 
relations also indicate equal social relations. While feminists may meaningfully 
differ over its definition, from liberal iterations to the Antioch College policy, 
consent remains a lodestar in the quest for sexual equality.109 Meanwhile, civil 
rights advocates dating back to Douglass and DuBois emphasize that until 
black people achieve full legal and social equality, black women’s sexual 
injuries will remain illegible as such, even within economies of formal 
consent.110
                                                          
107. Notably, both Angela Davis and Andrea Dworkin have used sexual terrorism to characterize 
sexual relations. Compare Angela Davis, Reflections on the Black Woman’s Role in the Community of 
Slaves, 13 MASS. REV. 81, 96 (1972)  (“In confronting the black woman as adversary in a sexual contest, 
the master would be subjecting her to the most elemental form of terrorism distinctively suited for the 
female: rape. Given the already terroristic texture of plantation life, it would be as potential victim of 
rape that the slave woman would be most unguarded.”), with Andrea Dworkin, Pornography: The New 
Terrorism, 8 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 215, 217 (1978-79) (“Pornography is the propaganda of 
sexual terrorism. . . . Female rebellion against male sexual despotism, female rebellion against male 
sexual authority, is now a reality throughout this country. The men, meeting rebellion with an escalation 
of terror, hang pictures of maimed female bodies in every public place.”). 
 Both decried black women’s sexual subordination at the hands of 
108. Some feminists allocate the duty to the object of desire to express or withhold consent; others 
endorse a regime in which the desiring party actively solicits consent. See, e.g., MAKING SENSE OF 
SEXUAL CONSENT (Mark Cowling & Paul Reynolds eds., 2004) (contemplating sexual consent outside 
the scope of both radical feminist rejections of consent as inextricably embedded in male domination 
and liberal defaults to individual agency as measure); Alan Soble, Antioch’s “Sexual Offense Policy”: A 
Philosophical Exploration, 28 J. SOC. PHIL. 22 (1997). 
109. See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, Shame, 79 B.U.L. REV. 663 (1999) (arguing for 
better distinctions between consensual and nonconsensual sex); Symposium, 41 AKRON L. REV. 839 
(2008) (discussing rape, consent, and sexual autonomy). The Antioch College Sexual Offense 
Prevention Policy required consent to “each new level of sexual activity” and mandated that body 
language and silence were not sufficient; verbal affirmation was required. THE ANTIOCH COLLEGE 
SEXUAL OFFENSE PREVENTION POLICY 1, http://antiochmedia.org/mirror/antiwarp/www.antioch-
college.edu/ Campus/sopp/SOPP2006%20.pdf. 
110. On the legibility of black suffering and its connection to “sentimental citizenship,” see 
generally REBECCA WANZO, THE SUFFERING WILL NOT BE TELEVISED: AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN 
AND SENTIMENTAL POLITICAL STORYTELLING (2009). I purposely use Douglass and Du Bois as 
examples of men who connected racial equality to black women’s sexual injury. See, e.g., W.E.B. DU 
BOIS, The Damnation of Women, in W.E.B. DU BOIS: A READER 299, 304-05 (David Levering Lewis 
ed., 1995) (“I shall forgive the white South much in its final judgment day . . . but one thing I shall never 
forgive, neither in this world nor the world to come: its wanton and continued and persistent insulting of 
the black womanhood which it sought and seeks to prostitute to its lust . . . . To no modern race does its 
women mean so much as to the Negro nor come so near to the fulfillment of its meaning.  As one of our 
women writes: ‘Only the black woman can say ‘when and where I enter, in the quiet, undisputed dignity 
of my womanhood, without violence and without suing or special patronage, then and there the whole 
Negro race enters with me.’”). Douglass’s abolitionist newspaper, The North Star, carried this slogan on 
its front page: “Right Is of No Sex—Truth Is of No Color—God Is the Father of Us All, and We Are All 
Brethren.” Douglass attended the 1848 Seneca Falls Convention to support women’s rights. In 1888, just 
before his death, he told the International Conference of Women that one of his proudest moments was 
his support for women’s rights forty years earlier. For a discussion of Douglass’s paper and both men’s 
views on gender equality, see BEVERLY GUY-SHEFTALL, 11 BLACK WOMEN IN UNITED STATES 
HISTORY: DAUGHTERS OF SORROW (Darlene Clark Hine ed., 1990). 
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white men. Less obviously, but no less centrally, consent is seen as intrinsically 
linked to equality for civil rights as well as feminism. 
This relentless focus on the material economies of bodies and power is part 
of what sends Halley and Walker screaming for the hills. Both reject justice 
projects’ minoritizing impulses and emphasis on power and subordination, and 
both seem to want to subvert the accompanying regulatory discourses of 
consent and egalitarianism. 
As summarized above, Halley indicts feminism for its first principles of 
equality and anti-subordination as measures of women’s welfare. Discussing 
Twyman v. Twyman, Halley hypothesizes that “power relationships between 
husband and wife are myriad, indeterminate, and not readily captured by 
dominance/subordination models.”111 In fact, she argues that feminism’s 
discourse of sex and power might actually be contributing to sexual injury. She 
also takes it to task for its “governance,” i.e., its regulatory impulses that cause 
it to systematically recruit state power to discipline and punish unegalitarian 
and subordinating sex.112
Even more provocatively than Halley, Walker proclaims herself bored by 
conventional civil rights justice and dignity projects, in her case as an aesthetic 
mission. Already resented for success without “paying dues,”
 
113 Walker 
disassociates herself from the racial establishment, which she derides as “the 
niggerati.”114 She expresses vast impatience with and derision for the civil 
rights generation and its cultural and historical icons. Poking fun at fire hose 
brutality, she indicts her brother for “seem[ing] to me to be a person who has 
been bracing himself for the fall, for the fire hoses, for the riot, for some kind 
of upsurge that’s racially motivated, then being in a situation where it never 
arrived: bracing himself for the fall but landing on a pillow.”115 She concludes, 
“That’s for me the middle class black experience.”116
                                                          
111. Halley, in Is Feminist Theory Enough?, supra note 
 But according to Walker, 
her brother is not alone: “Everyone wants to play the nigger now. There is more 
56, at 615; see also HALLEY,  supra note 4, 
at 346 (“If a social subordination exists and an antisubordination discourse—while also pursuing its 
antisubordination  goals—ratifies it, fixes it, creates the discursive capacity for its experiential uptake by 
the subordinated, all the while hanging a bull’s-eye on it, then where does one intervene to attack it?”). 
112. See supra notes 65-76 and accompanying text. 
113. “She has won major awards, the fervent support of many collectors and galleries, the adoration 
of curators . . .  and the appreciation of art historians.  She also has inspired the unprecedented disdain of 
artists like Betye Saar and Howardina Pindell and many others within African American cultural 
circles.” HARRIS, supra note 2, at 210. While this may sound like sour grapes, older black artists were 
subjected to structural racism and exclusion in the mainstream art world. In contrast, four years after her 
MacArthur award, Walker was selected to represent the United States at the 2002 Bienal de São Paulo 
and then the 2007 Venice Biennale. KARA WALKER, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF THE ARTS, 
http://arts.columbia.edu/visual-arts/kara-walker. 
114. A Conversation Between Darius James and Kara Walker, supra note 31, at 1 (“Harvard and 
Henry Louis Gates, Jr. also put on a kind of niggerati circus in 1998 that I failed to attend–probably to 
my detriment, but I hate being lion fodder.”). 
115. Bowles, supra note 30, at 8. 
116. Id. 
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power in the role of the underdog, pop culture tells us.”117 Particularly in her 
crosshairs is older black Americans’ insistence on dignity and humanity in the 
face of racial humiliation and shame. Of hearing older black people singing Lift 
Every Voice and Sing, James Weldon Johnson’s ode to black faith in and hope 
for equality and liberty, Walker says, “To hear a song of such social and moral 
uplift dragged, kicking and screaming, by the well-meaning tone-deaf . . . 
seemed a cruel yet apt metaphor for African America as the 20th century 
prepares to retire.”118 Paralleling Halley’s argument on the feminist production 
of sexual injury, Walker concludes that civil rights discourse has made injury 
the sine qua non of racial identity. “I think really the whole problem with 
racism and its continuing legacy in this country is that we simply love it. Who 
would we be without it and without the ‘struggle’?”119
In the end, Walker and Halley share a disinterest in, even an indictment of, 
the justice claims and critiques—anti-subordination, minoritized identity, 
egalitarian regulation—conventionally articulated by civil rights and feminism. 
Both disclaim the structural analyses that ground feminist and civil rights 
critiques of social and sexual power. And frankly, both appear bored by the 
investigations into material economies of injury and violation that have long 
been standard among the liberal/left. Instead, power dissipates in Halley’s law 
and Walker’s art as it is reworked into the personal, the individual’s ecstasy, 
without attention to its accumulation in society or collectively in groups. 
 
“Inside” indictments of justice projects are certainly not new. Some blacks 
have long distanced themselves from civil rights initiatives, and women 
castigating feminism has a long pedigree.120
                                                          
117. Walker elaborates, “History is carried like a pathology, a cyclical melodrama immersed in 
artifice and unable to function without it. The historical romance creates a will for abusive submission, 
exacerbated by contemporary ideologies that revere victimhood.” SHAW, supra note 
 Some contemporary blacks call for 
color-blindness in lieu of racial consciousness and many women affirm 
conventional gender roles. What is different, and hence interesting, about 
6, at 118. 
118. Bowles, supra note 30, at 8. 
119. Reid-Pharr, supra note 26, at 33 (emphasis in original); Kara Walker, “Kara Walker 
interviewed by Liz Armstrong,” in No Place (Like Home) (Richard Flood ed., 1997); see also James 
Hannaham, Pea, Ball, Bounce: Interview with Kara Walker, 28 INTERVIEW 119 (Nov. 1998) (“It seems 
like I had to actually reinvent or make up my own racist situations so I would know how to deal with 
them as black people in the past did. In order to have a real connection with my history I had to be 
somebody’s slave. But I was in control. That was the difference.”). 
120. For discussions of alternative black political traditions, see, for example, CHRISTOPHER ALAN 
BRACEY, SAVIORS OR SELLOUTS: THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF BLACK CONSERVATISM FROM BOOKER T. 
WASHINGTON TO CONDELEEZA RICE (2008); MICHAEL L. ONDAATJE, BLACK CONSERVATIVE 
INTELLECTUALS IN MODERN AMERICA (2010); DEAN E. ROBINSON, BLACK NATIONALISM IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS AND THOUGHT (2001); Adjoa A. Aiyetoro & Adrienne D. Davis, Historic and 
Modern Social Movements for Reparations: The National Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in 
America (N’COBRA) and Its Antecedents, 16 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 687 (2010). For discussions of 
women’s opposition to feminism, see, for example, DONALD T. CRITCHLOW, PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY AND 
GRASSROOTS CONSERVATISM: A WOMAN’S CRUSADE (2005); RONNEE SCHREIBER, RIGHTING 
FEMINISM: CONSERVATIVE WOMEN AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2008); Thomas Jablonksy, Female 
Opposition: The Anti-Suffrage Campaign, in VOTES FOR WOMEN: THE STRUGGLE FOR SUFFRAGE 
REVISITED 118 (Jean H. Baker ed., 2002). 
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Walker’s and Halley’s aesthetic and political claims is that they do not line up 
with these arguably “conservative” critiques of justice projects either. Far from 
embracing a color-blind aesthetic, Walker’s art gains its aesthetic traction from 
racial depictions and caricatures, and Halley is hardly interested in the family 
values/missionary sex endorsed by most anti-feminists. 
Rather, what distinguishes their indictments is that both attempt to ground 
their rejection of conventional justice projects in an alternative conception of 
bodies and power, one not rooted in civil rights’ and feminism’s first principles 
of sexual injury and subordination, equality, and regulation. And both turn to 
the concept of abjection—the liberatory potential of suffering and 
degradation—to do so. 
As noted, Halley finds in “Queer Theory by Men” the celebration, the 
eroticization, of dominance. Rejecting feminism’s regulatory discourses of 
consent and egalitarianism, Halley finds in male-authored queer theory the 
liberatory and redemptive possibility of loss of self, of absence of control. 
“Shame is deeply embroidered into this image of erotic life.”121
  
 Sex holds the 
possibility, through suffering, degradation, and humiliation, of challenging the 
primacy of identity and the grip of dimorphic gender. She embraces Bersani’s 
 willingness to affirm sexuality as carrying an appetite for deep threats 
  to integrated selfhood, its willingness to lose touch of propositional 
  ethical logic to do so, its plunge into a profoundly irresolvable 
  problematic of desire, and its fragmentation not only of the self but of 
  the gendered self . . . .122
 
 
Locating pleasure in abjection rejects mutuality and reciprocity as sexual goals, 
instead seeking the shattering, the explosion, indeed, the annihilation of self. 
Through shamed desire and shamed pleasure, “suffering can be what people 
seek.”123
Several commentators, as well as the artist herself, have commented on the 
role of the abject in Walker’s art. Most notably, art scholars Michael Corris and 
 
                                                          
121. Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 36. 
122. Id. at 25. 
123. Halley, in Is Feminist Theory Enough?, supra note 56, at 617 (2003). Halley elaborates 
elsewhere: 
 
[A]s long as men and women do find intense pleasure inside the eroticization of domination; 
as long as pleasure sometimes takes the form of pain, and pain of pleasure; as long as desire 
can extend its reach to shame; as long as gender as power-over is subject to complex psychic 
reversals; as long as the resulting highly volatile system is understood to provide the raw 
material both for domination and for “resistance, compromise, and opportunism”; as long as 
these conclusions about our life in sexuality hold, it could never be “just ‘the truth’” that the 
scenario we are construing was only pleasure/resistance and not something bad as well, or 
only something bad and not pleasure/resistance as well. 
 
Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 37-38 (emphasis added). 
DAVIS BAD GIRLS OF ART & LAW.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 6/8/2011  9:00 AM 
130 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. XX:NNN 
Robert Hobbs applaud her use of abjection to rethink social stereotypes: “The 
body is opened to the social order, a more permeable world that experiences 
flows from the inside as well as from the outside.”124 If silhouettes are 
“rendered intelligible by their margins,” then Walker makes excellent use of 
this medium to foreground the abject, focusing attention on acts of penetrating 
orifices traditionally defined as sexually taboo (fellatio, sodomy, bestiality, 
pedophilia).125 This is classic abjection, the blurring of social boundaries by 
blurring bodily ones. Most controversially, Walker herself claims abjection in 
explaining her art, as “lur[ing] viewers into something ‘totally demeaning and 
possibly very beautiful.’”126 Elsewhere, describing her own reaction to racist 
images she says, “Those postcard coon images aren’t ugly because they’re 
ugly, they’re hateful because they’re cute, loveable, desirable.”127 As 
caricatures, her renderings of slavery’s violence, racial and sexual degradation, 
and general debauchery induce in viewers an impulse to giggle at this national 
trauma. Caricatures are cartoons; as simple characterizations, they are often 
designed to induce laughter. But there is something about how viewers’ find 
their own cartoonish fantasies literally projected onto the walls to cavort among 
Walker’s silhouettes that many find disturbing. And, like Halley, Walker 
embraces sexual shame and the seductiveness of degradation. She explains, 
“My work is intended to function like Harlequin romance novels which veil 
themselves in history and encourage women to participate in stories that are not 
in their best interests.”128 Indeed, Walker celebrates her own shamed desire 
through adolescent relations with white boys who sought to, in her words, 
exploit her: “‘I guess that’s when I decided to offer up my side-long glances: to 
be a slave just a little bit.’”129
Walker’s invocation of blacks “wanting to be slaves a little bit” is different 
when she invokes it for herself versus when she indicts other blacks for the 
same thing. When she recounts her adolescent relationships with white boys, 
self-described as exploitative, her explanation of “wanting to be a slave a little 
bit” is quite Halley-like in its embrace of shame and humiliation as possibly 
erotic. On the other hand, when she characterizes other blacks as wanting to be 
 In abjection’s embrace of shame and degradation, 
Walker appears to seek the converse of the dignity that the civil rights 
generation sought and that she derides. 
                                                          
124. Corris & Hobbs, supra note 8, at 425; see also Kara Walker, The Debate Continues: Kara 
Walker’s Response, 15 INTL. REV. AF.-AM. ART 48, 48 (1998) (“At this historical juncture, 
consideration of the production of visual meaning can engage the fascination with abjection by 
enunciating the desire, contradiction, misperception, and fantasy that fuel history and society.”). 
125. SHAW, supra note 6, at 36. 
126. Bowles, supra note 30, at 7. 
127. A Conversation Between Darius James and Kara Walker, supra note 31, at 1. 
128. Bowles, supra note 30, at 8. 
129. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 213. He continues “that the side-long glance is her answer to the 
male gaze: ‘It’s a look unreliable women give.’” Id. According to Harris, “[h]er silhouettes build on the 
idea of a profile as a side-long glance,” which Harris finds to be the beginning of feminist “back talk.” 
Id. 
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slaves “just a little bit,” followed by the indictment, “It gives people heaping 
teaspoons of dignity and pride,” she seems to be making a different Halley 
move—accusing them of what Wendy Brown would call wounded attachments, 
their identity as a minority group lying in their perpetual reenactment of 
injury.130 Readers of these interviews with Walker might be so shocked by her 
inflammatory invocations of desires to be mastered that they might miss these 
two very different rhetorical moves and how each resonates with Halley in a 
different way.131
Finally, central to their mutual embrace of abjection is Walker’s and 
Halley’s creation of alter egos who revel in suffering and degradation. As 
mentioned earlier, Halley’s important essay, Queer Theory by Men, is authored 
by one “Ian Halley.”
 
132 Through Ian, Halley rejects the identitarian injuries and 
commitments she argues feminism projects onto her body, read as female and 
lesbian. Instead, Ian represents a politics not “for women” but “for gay 
men.”133 As Ian, Halley further focuses on Bersani’s “affirmation of a shamed 
desire and a shamed pleasure because they are a desire and a pleasure: it’s as if 
he had said ‘we desire it, and love it when we get it, so it’s good.’”134 Similarly, 
Walker’s much-noted blurring of her art and her person has been a key point of 
contestation with her critics.135 Her ubiquitous “Negress Wench” is not only a 
stock character in her tableaux but also an alternative creative persona.136
                                                          
130. WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY 53 (1995) 
(exploring “the ways in which certain troubling aspects of the specific genealogy of politicized identity 
are carried in its political demands, ways in which certain emancipatory aims of politicized identity are 
subverted not only by the constraints of the political discourses in which its operations transpire but by 
its own wounded attachments.”). 
 
131. I thank Mary Anne Case for pointing this out to me. 
132. Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 7. 
133. Id. at 18. Wiegman’s essay notes that Halley participates in the “‘traffic in gay men,’ a term 
which denotes the proliferation by lesbian thinkers, activists, and culture makers of a grammar of sex 
drawn from, often in overt debt to, gay male sexual styles and their idealization.” Wiegman, supra note 
94, at 93. Ranjana  Khanna asks, 
 
 If Janet Halley owns the words of Ian Halley, what is suggested about the constitution of the 
 self, responsibility, and agency designated in the signature and in the name of the copyright 
 holder? . . .  Janet seems particularly keen to maintain ownership of Ian, and in some ways 
 continues to insist her presence even though she presents herself as absent. 
 
Khanna, supra note 104, at 70. Indeed, there is an arguable tension as to whether Halley is anti-
identitarian or pro-ambiguity, i.e., sometimes she appears confidently pro-male, as in her endorsement of 
Duncan Kennedy’s taking account of heterosexual male interests and the residuum of risk to men. At 
these times she seems more interested in keeping M/F but flipping F > M, which seems decidedly 
identitarian. For a discussion of Kennedy and how he figures into Halley’s work, see infra note 152. 
134. Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 19. 
135. According to one critic, Walker “has made a bargain with the viewer to implicate herself in 
the imagery.” HARRIS, supra note 2, at 212. Cf. Keizer, supra note 42, at 1670 (“Walker uses her 
personae to make a wide range of often contradictory statements.”). 
136. Two installations are attributed to nineteenth century “Missus K.E.B. Walker, Colored,” which 
is a literary reference to an autobiography form favored by nineteenth century blacks. See Presenting 
Negro Scenes Drawn Upon My Passage Through the South and Reconfigured for the Benefit of 
Enlightened Audiences Wherever Such May Be Found, By Myself, Missus K.E.B. Walker, Colored 
(1997) Kara Walker, reprinted in PICTURES FROM ANOTHER TIME, supra note 8, at 36. A subsequent 
DAVIS BAD GIRLS OF ART & LAW.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 6/8/2011  9:00 AM 
132 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. XX:NNN 
(Interestingly black men do not figure as significantly in Walker’s sexualized 
representations. The notable exception are images of black men’s decapitated 
heads, including a rather blunt analogy between anthropomorphism and race-
mixing that features white swans with ill-fitting black men’s heads.)137 Self-
consciously periodizing herself as part of a post-civil rights generation, she 
rejects the juridical imperative’s interpretation of her experience. Disputing 
critics’ interpretations of her early interracial sexual experiences as “abuse,” 
Walker proclaims her own embrace of what has been conventionally 
interpreted as sexual degradation and violation in the service of racial 
supremacy. (Recall her explanation of those experiences: “I guess that’s when I 
decided to offer up my side-long glances: to be a slave just a little bit.”138) Like 
Halley, Walker rejects the regulatory discourses of consent and egalitarianism 
erected to protect her from racial and sexual danger. Hence, through the 
“Negress Wench” and “Ian,” choosing as their registers another black woman 
and a gay man, Walker and Halley have inserted themselves as objects of the 
discourse, featured players in shadow dramas of their own.139
In the end, abjection functions for both Halley and Walker as a crucial 
alternative to civil rights’s and feminism’s structural and material analyses of 
power and injury. Halley explicitly grounds her academic critique of 
feminism’s governance in abjection; Walker’s invocations are more complex, 
but she is no less committed to deploying abjection to aesthetically disrupt civil 
rights discourse. For both, abjection, as a genealogy of sex and power, 
 
                                                          
installation is even more self-referential: No mere words can Adequately reflect the Remorse this 
Negress feels at having been Cast into such a lowly state by her former Masters and so it is with a 
Humble heart that she brings about their physical Ruin and earthly Demise (1999), reprinted in id. at 
68. Other attributions include the “Emancipated Negress”; “An African Anonymous Adventuress” from 
Endless Conundrum; the “Black Heart of a Negress” from Excavated; and “Dusky Thighs of One Young 
Negress” from Gone. My Complement, supra note 14, at 384-89 (exhibition list). Furthermore, in an 
interview, Walker describes her efforts to “set up a narrative of herself.” Armstrong, supra note 119, at 
104. More recently, Walker distanced herself from this persona: 
 
  There were a couple of long-winded titles for different works and shows where the word 
  ‘negress’ was prominent—partially as a device and partially as a way of distancing myself 
  from myself, or liberating myself from myself, or something….  I have rather stopped doing 
  that now. It got a little tired after a while. 
 
Robert Ayers, “Almost Political by Accident.” A Conversation with Artist Kara Walker, THE 
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 26, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-ayers/almost-political-by-
accid_b_773039.html. 
137. This is featured in at least two installations, The Emancipation Approximation (1999-2000) 
Kara Walker, reprinted in PICTURES FROM ANOTHER TIME, supra note 8, at 82-83; and No mere words 
can Adequately reflect the Remorse this Negress feels at having been Cast into such a lowly state by her 
former Masters and so it is with a Humble heart that she brings about their physical Ruin and earthly 
Demise, supra note 136. 
138. See supra note 129. 
139. The devices through which Walker and Halley transform their persona, time and sex, are 
themselves telling of their projects. Walker, a black woman, essentially re-periodizes herself, while 
Halley’s alter ego, a gay man, plays with both gender and sexuality. As I describe infra note 187, this is 
emblematic of the different idealized forms in which the two work, Walker’s nostalgia and Halley’s 
utopianism. I thank Mary Anne Case for suggesting this to me. 
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emphasizes the liberatory value of degrading bodily violation rather than its 
indictment as a source of inequality and subordination. Instead of equality and 
conventional justice, abjection permits, and even endorses, humiliation and 
shame as constitutive of human subjectivity. 
II. GENEALOGIES OF ABJECTION 
Halley and Walker are correct in that abjection is very much about power.  
But can it stand for dematerialization and disavowal? I am skeptical. This 
section proffers a brief genealogy of abjection—from Julia Kristeva’s classic 
account to Leo Bersani’s more narrow one. It then considers whether either 
account offers the conceptual grounding Halley and Walker might seek for 
their disavowal projects. 
A. Abjection: Classic & Subversive 
Abjection is classically associated with French theorist Julia Kristeva.140 
Challenging the primacy of desire in psychoanalytic thought, Kristeva 
identifies the foundational role of exclusion and limits in shaping human 
subjectivity and the social order. Abjection is fundamentally concerned with 
“inside/outside boundar[ies],” banishments, and limits.141 It links the integrity 
of the individual—his guarding of his own margins—to the integrity of the 
social order. To belong, one must exclude.142 Following anthropologist Mary 
Douglas’ work on pollution, Kristeva argues that filth is never a quality itself, 
but relates to a boundary and “the object jettisoned out of the boundary, its 
other side, a margin.”143
                                                          
140. See KRISTEVA, supra note 
 Kristeva’s interest is in the border that establishes the 
limit between the clean and proper and the filthy and banished. She argues it is 
the fascination with the border itself, with the margin, that constitutes the 
91. 
141. Id. at 114. 
142. [A]bjection is coextensive with social and symbolic order, on the individual as well as on the 
  collective level. By virtue of this, abjection, just like prohibition of incest, is a universal 
  phenomenon; one encounters it as soon as the symbolic and/or social dimension of man is 
  constituted, and this throughout the course of civilization. But abjection assumes specific 
  shapes and different codings according to the various “symbolic systems.” 
 
Id. at 68 (emphasis in original). Toril Moi also points out Kristeva’s articulation of psychoanalysis as a 
discourse of love as opposed to desire, mandated by the ethics of the therapist/patient relationship. THE 
KRISTEVA READER 17-18, 238 (Toril Moi ed., 1986). See also MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH 
NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE 81-147 (2000) (making an analogous 
argument that marriage loses its meaning if everyone can do it). 
143. KRISTEVA, supra note 91, at 69. She continues, “[t]he potency of pollution is therefore not an 
inherent one; it is proportional to the potency of the prohibition that founds it.” Id. Motivated by 
culturally specific impulses, societies identify sources of pollution and threatening objects and establish 
their limits, their boundaries against these threatening others. 
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abject.144
In configuring what is interior to limits as belonging, one discovers the loss 
of what has been jettisoned and excluded, the subject’s “inaugural loss that laid 
the foundations of  its own being” and inclusion in the social order.
 By respecting this limit defining inside and outside, belonging and 
exclusion, the subject emerges from chaos, yet suffers in doing so. 
145 This loss 
is experienced as a void, a missing piece that the subject seeks and yet must 
disclaim. It draws the limit, and yet immediately regrets it. The abject then, is 
not the excluded, despised thing, but rather is the subject’s own loss, 
“silhouetted as non-being,” as a gulf, an abyss, threatening and yet 
beckoning.146 Hence, “from its place of banishment, the abject does not cease 
challenging its master.”147 Rather, “the abject simultaneously beseeches and 
pulverizes the subject.”148 Abjection wavers between the loss of meaning in 
“absolute degradation” and the unbearable ecstasy in this suffering.149 The 
greatest threat posed by the banished is its ongoing power to fascinate, even as 
it repulses and disgusts. In the end, the “intimate side [of abjection] is suffering 
and horror its public feature.”150 The agony and the ecstasy. This is the power 
of abjection.151
                                                          
144. Abjection functions by constituting a deject, which constantly questions not its being but its 
place, situating itself by asking “Where Am I” as opposed to “Who Am I?”  Id. at 8. 
 
145. Id. at 5. 
146. Id. at 67. Kristeva expresses this simultaneous agony and ecstasy of differentiation through 
exclusion as crests, heights of harmony, and crescendos. 
147. Id. at 2. 
148. Id. at 5 
149. Id. at 18. 
150. Id. at 140.  Towards the end of the book she refers to abjection as “the power of fascination 
exerted upon us, openly or secretly, by that field of horror.” Id. at 208. 
151. The question of subjectivity and belonging or “exile” pervades other aspects of Kristeva’s 
work on psychoanalysis. Like Powers of Horror, Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia and 
especially Strangers to Ourselves investigate the subject’s formation through the linguistic, the maternal, 
and the anthropological. JULIA KRISTEVA, BLACK SUN: DEPRESSION AND MELANCHOLIA 11 (Leon S. 
Roudiez trans., Columbia University Press 1989) (1987) (“For my identification with the loved-hated 
other, through incorporation-introjection-projection, leads me to imbed in myself its sublime component, 
which becomes my necessary, tyrannical judge, as well as its subject component, which demeans me 
and of which I desire to rid myself.”); JULIA KRISTEVA, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES 1 (Leon S. Roudiez 
trans., Columbia University Press 1991) (“Strangely, the foreigner lives within us: he is the hidden face 
of our identity, the space that wrecks our abode, the time in which understanding and affinity founder.  
By recognizing him within ourselves, we are spared detesting him in himself. A symptom that precisely 
turns ‘we’ into a problem, perhaps makes it impossible, The foreigner comes in when the consciousness 
of my difference arises, and he disappears when we all acknowledge ourselves as foreigners, 
unamenable to bonds and communities.”). (Although I doubt that Kristeva’s interlocution of the 
meaning and “absorption” of otherness and how we define ourselves, collectively and individually, is 
what Halley intends to capture, either. Id. at 2.) In particular, Kristeva’s notion of the “foreigner” also 
rests on the outsider who is crucial to the construction of community and subjectivity, although in this 
text she focuses in addition on the subjectivity of the foreigner himself, through his perpetual exile and 
original loss of the mother and maternal language. 
 
 Living with the other, with the foreigner, confronts us with the possibility or not of being an  
 other. It is not simply—humanistically—a matter of our being able to accept the other, but of 
 being in his place, and this means to imagine and make oneself other for oneself. 
 
Id. at 13. And, for the foreigner himself:  
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In 1987, Leo Bersani’s germinal queer text, Is the Rectum a Grave?, 
deployed abjection to a different use.152 If Kristeva’s classic psychoanalytic 
conception concerned itself with the linguistic, the maternal, and the 
anthropological aspects of abjection, Bersani’s interests were in its political and 
subversive potential. Outraged by the “homophobic rage unleashed by the 
AIDS crisis,” Bersani located both the threat and the subversive potential of 
homosexuality in the “hygienics of social power” invoked by gay men’s 
association with anal penetration.153
With the politics of gay identity (indeed with “gay” as an identity) in crisis, 
Bersani’s essay sought sexual liberation in the gay male sex act itself. In his 
assessment, neither of the mainstream gay political modes, minoritizing 
analogies to other subordinated groups nor appeals to liberal impulses and 
values—the “Whitmanesque” bathhouse for instance—grappled with anal 
eroticism. Hence they failed to meet homophobia head on.
 
154 More 
intriguingly, though, Bersani indicts putatively “queer” political projects for 
also turning away from sex and the body. He re-centers the gay male sex act to 
counter a tendency toward “the redemptive reinvention” of sex he argues is 
more rooted in analyses of power than of sex and anal eroticism.155
                                                          
“The foreigner . . . does not give the same weight to ‘origins’ as common sense does.  He has fled from 
that origin—family, blood, soil—and, even though it keeps pestering, enriching, hindering, exciting him, 
or giving him pain, and often all of it at once, the foreigner is its courageous and melancholy betrayer.  
His origin certainly haunts him, for better and for worse, but it is indeed elsewhere that he has set his 
hopes, that his struggles take place, that his life holds together today.”   
 For 
Id. at 29 (emphasis in the original). 
152. Bersani, supra note 76. Bersani’s later work, Homos, reiterates and refines this notion of a gay 
male identity rooted in “love of the cock.” LEO BERSANI, HOMOS 103 (1995) (arguing against 
“desexualizing discourses” of gay identity); cf. Leo Bersani, Sociality & Sexuality, 26 CRITICAL 
INQUIRY 641, 648 (2000) (“To neglect self-defeat in sexual relations leads to that pastoralizing of 
sexuality that I have frequently criticized; but to privilege self-defeat in the relational field is to reduce 
that entire field to libidinal relationality.”). Some associate Bersani’s later writings with the trend toward 
“queer negativity” or “the antisocial thesis” also articulated by Lee Edelman, Tim Dean, and Judith 
Halberstam. See, e.g., TIM DEAN, UNLIMITED INTIMACY: REFLECTIONS ON THE SUBCULTURE OF 
BAREBACKING (2009); LEE EDELMAN, NO FUTURE: QUEER THEORY AND THE DEATH DRIVE (2004); 
Judith Halberstam, The Anti-Social Turn in Queer Studies, 5 GRADUATE J. SOC. SCI. 140 (2008). As 
Benjy Kahan notes, this view refuses dreams of the future grounded in redemptive narratives of the past, 
in which past histories of suffering, stigma, and violence are either overcome or memorialized (as Kahan 
succinctly puts it, “we will never go back” or “we will never forget.”). Comment by Benjy Kahan to 
Adrienne Davis at Colloquium, supra note 1. See, e.g., HEATHER LOVE, FEELING BACKWARD: LOSS 
AND THE POLITICS OF QUEER HISTORY 5 (2007) (calling it the “backward turn” in queer studies). 
Although Bersani’s discursive trajectory is complex, I focus on the germinal work, Is the Rectum a 
Grave? because Halley locates her embrace of queer theory by men in this single essay by Bersani and 
an additional one by “straight” scholar Duncan Kennedy. See supra note 133. DUNCAN KENNEDY, 
Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing, and the Eroticization of Domiance, in SEXY DRESSING ETC. (1993). 
153. Bersani, Is the Rectum a Grave?, supra note 76, at 212, 213. Cf. Wiegman, supra note 94, at 
96 (describing absence of lesbians in Bersani’s work). Wiegman enjoins him (and Janet) to “remember 
bois and grrrls have butts too.” Id. at 116; see also EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, A Poem Is Being Written, 
in TENDENCIES 177 (1993) (mourning the absence of discourse of female anal eroticism). 
154. Bersani, Is the Rectum a Grave?, supra note 76, at 206, 205-07. 
155. Id. at 215. Bersani rejects gay-macho, gay-femme, and lesbian-butch style as subversion by 
parody and by “honor” because of latent hostility. He contends these stylistic aesthetics “deny what I 
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instance, Bersani fears that Foucault’s emphasis on bodies and pleasures shares 
with radical feminism’s indictment of heterosexual intercourse a “[frequently] 
hidden agreement about sexuality as being . . . less disturbing, less socially 
abrasive, less violent, more respectful of ‘personhood’ than it has been in a 
male-dominated, phallocentric culture.”156 In contrast, Bersani wants to defend, 
indeed to preserve, the “anticommunal, antiegalitarian, antinurturing, 
antiloving” aspects of the sex act.157 Bersani then locates not just social 
subordination, but political possibility in the “seductive and intolerable image 
of a grown man, legs high in the air, unable to refuse the suicidal ecstasy of 
being a woman.”158
Bersani uses abjection to counter “pastoralizing” political impulses. He 
finds in the “exploded limits” and “ecstatic suffering” of the sexual the ability 
to achieve a “more radical disintegration and humiliation of the self.”
 Bersani then asks the crucial question: What is the political 
possibility in suicidal ecstasy?  Herein lies the essay’s status as a germinal text 
on abjection. 
159 While 
there is the “temptation to deny the. . . strong appeal of powerlessness, of the 
loss of control,”160 Bersani urges that “[h]uman bodies are constructed in such 
a way that it is, or at least has been, almost impossible not to associate mastery 
and subordination with the experience of our most intense pleasures.”161 
Bersani’s abjection is all about transgressed boundaries, plunging beyond “a 
certain threshold of endurance” and the body’s capacity for pleasure when its 
margin is violated, abolished.162
                                                          
take to be wholly nonsubversive intentions by conflating them with problematically subversive effects.”  
Id. at 207. 
 It is precisely in the self-shattering and self-
annihilating aspects of sex that he finds the potential for liberation. “Queer” sex 
should embrace the shame in abdicating power, not run from it in pastoralizing 
156. Bersani, supra note 76, at 215 (Foucault and others “argue[] for a radically revised 
imagination of the body’s capacity for pleasure”). For Foucault, this flows from his turning away from 
sex itself, “from the acts in which [the body] engages, from the pain it inflicts and begs for—and directs 
our attention to the romances of memory and the idealization of the presexual, the courting 
imagination.” Id. at 219-220. For MacKinnon and Dworkin, Bersani shows that their indictment of sex 
had the “effect of publicizing, of lucidly laying out for us” abject sex. Id. at 215. He also refers to Gayle 
Rubin, (the old) Pat Califia, Jeffrey Weeks and Simon Watney. Id. Bersani elaborates this incipient 
critique of how Foucault “de-gays” gay identity in HOMOS and Sociality and Sexuality. BERSANI, 
HOMOS, supra note 152, at 77-112 (“What strikes me as most interesting about this argument is a 
connection that Foucault appears to deny in the Salmagundi interview when he says that it is not sex acts 
themselves that are most troubling to nongays, but the gay lifestyle, those ‘as yet unforeseen kinds of 
relationships.’” Id. at 81-82.); Leo Bersani, Sociality and Sexuality, 26 CRITICAL INQUIRY 641, 641-42 
(2000) (using Foucault’s contention that society’s discomfort with homosexuality is not due to the sex 
act to interrogate psychoanalytic and philosophical conceptions of the self, sexuality, and relationality). 
157. Bersani, supra note 76, at 215. 
158. Id. at 212. 
159. Id. at 215, 217. 
160. Id. at 217. 
161. Id. at 216. 
162. Id. at 217. 
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redemptive moves.163
Clearly then, Bersani’s abjection builds on and yet departs from Kristeva’s 
classic conception. Again, in Kristeva’s psychoanalytic model, it is the 
fascination with, the attraction to, the separation and suffering from that which 
has been expelled, and hence lost, that constitutes the abject. Kristeva appears 
most interested in abjection in its noun and verb forms: the abject and to abject 
(or ab-ject). In other words, in abjection as longing and loss for what has been 
excluded and expelled. In contrast, Bersani’s interest is in the political 
possibility of abjection as a state of being, or non-being, as it were. His 
emphasis is on the capacity of shameful suffering to shatter the subject, fracture 
the self. His abjection re-centers the expelled body and its subversive potential 
in sexual politics. For Kristeva, the abjector suffers from its own longing for 
what has been lost. For Bersani, the abjected object embraces his own filthy 
expulsion, thereby subverting his exclusion into a politics of belonging and 
identity. Both Bersani and Kristeva find in abjection an account of human 
subjectivity, an alternative to dominant liberal conceptions of the coherent, 
desiring subject. 
 For Bersani, if the source of our exclusion is supposed to 
subordinate us, we can instead embrace it as a politics of identity. 
As the next Part will argue, Kristeva’s classic iteration of abjection and 
Bersani’s subversive one (in particular I think) pose some fascinating questions 
about the limits of sex and shame as normative conceptions of bodies and 
power in Walker’s and Halley’s work. 
B. Abjection, Materiality, and Power 
The heart of Julia Kristeva’s project is to illuminate the simultaneous 
articulation and violation of boundaries. Walker’s silhouettes conform to this 
conception of abjection almost exactly. The bounded edges of her silhouettes 
seem to delineate hard and fast boundaries, yet they continually invite their 
own penetration and violation. In addition, they distract from the other 
boundary violation, that between the viewer and the tableau, thereby blurring 
established delineations between art and audience. And, as art historian 
Michael Murphy noted, this secondary violation may in fact be contingent on 
the viewer’s focus on the “edginess” of the cutouts and the “outrageousness” of 
the topic.164
                                                          
163. See Bersani, supra note 
 In fact, the viewer loses her own innocence as she finds herself 
inserted into Walker’s tableaux. Abjection read in its classic form as expulsion, 
longing, and loss is highly descriptive of Walker’s work. What Walker 
provocatively represents is racial loss and longing, of both blacks and whites. 
76, at 221 (The redemptive “ambition of performing sex as only 
power is a salvational project, one designed to preserve us from a nightmare of ontological obscenity, 
from the prospect of a breakdown of the human itself in sexual intensities, from a kind of selfless 
communication with ‘lower’ orders of being.”). 
164. Comment by Michael Murphy to Adrienne Davis at Colloquium, supra note 1. 
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Both yearn for less complicated sexual pasts and race relations, fetishes of an 
innocent white sexual past and the juridical imperative respectively, long since 
expelled and surrendered to updated racial histories. In Walker, racial 
innocence, of both blacks and whites, is that which is expelled and yet mourned 
precisely because of its expulsion. Sexual loss is the price of racial belonging. 
Halley appears less interested in classic abjection than in Bersani’s 
subversive iteration. As Part I explains, she grounds her break from feminism 
and queer embrace of abjection in Bersani’s Is the Rectum a Grave? And, 
although Walker’s commitments are less explicit, she, like Halley, appears 
most interested in abjection’s disruptive possibilities, its capacity to subvert and 
generate aesthetic, and hence political, discursive ruptures. In Halley’s Taking 
a Break from Feminism and Walker’s installations and accompanying 
interviews we find a common commitment to the liberatory possibilities of 
“shamed desire,” “shamed pleasure,” and the seductiveness of degradation. 
Both endorse the “anticommunal, antiegalitarian, antinurturing, antiloving” 165
Paradoxically, though, it is in Bersani’s subversive abjection that we find 
the limits of Walker’s and Halley’s desires and claims for sex and shame as 
normative. This is particularly acute for Halley, who explicitly grounds her 
embrace of abjection in “queer theory by men,” with Bersani as her avatar. 
Specifically, she misses three analytic moves I take to be central to subversive 
abjection. While they pose challenges for both projects, in the end, I think, they 
prove more fatal for Halley, given her specific embrace of a politics of 
abjection as articulated in Bersani’s “queer theory by men.” 
 
aspects of human and sexual relations, disavowing justice projects and their 
accompanying discourses of minoritized identity, anti-subordination, and 
regulation. 
The first point of divergence is in Halley’s and Walker’s disavowal of 
justice projects’ focus on anti-subordination and explorations of material 
economies of power and injury. Recall, both dematerialize sex, with slavery’s 
labor and production relations absent from the moonlight and magnolia 
representations in Walker’s silhouettes, and Halley’s essays rendered as 
seemingly self-consciously and purposely abstract. Bersani’s subversive 
abjection manifests a serious attention to the economic and material structures 
in which sexual acts occur and from which they take their meaning. As noted, 
Is the Rectum a Grave? is rooted in the mid-1980s AIDS crisis and “how a 
public health crisis [became] treated like an unprecedented sexual threat.”166
                                                          
165. Bersani, Is the Rectum a Grave?, supra note 
 
Bersani makes broad-ranging links between health care policies, media 
representations, mortality statistics that value bodies in different ways, and 
labor policies that subsidize some forms of care-giving and not others. In 
opposition to Walker’s and Halley’s dematerialized bodies, Bersani’s essay is 
76, at 215. 
166. Id. at 198. 
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utterly grounded in the background distribution of power and resources 
between groups and how these materially affect real bodies.167
Also of interest to Bersani are geographic manifestations of sexuality and 
its regulation, most notably bathhouses and their practices, hierarchies, and 
ideologies. There is a vast theoretical literature on how spatial configurations 
influence human relations and possibility.
 
168 Most obviously, overtly “gay” 
relationships became possible with the rise of hotels and other spaces that 
permitted rebellious sex.169
Second, Bersani’s is explicitly an identity claim. As noted, he seeks to 
reconceive a gay male identity and politics in contradistinction to Foucault, 
Weeks, and Watney’s pastoralizing and redemptive articulations. (He also 
gives mild attention to how gays are excluded from mainstream institutions.
 Again, Bersani would be among the first to call 
attention to how these background conditions influence abjection’s political 
possibility. Subversive abjection requires certain pre-conditions, and this in 
turn requires attention to the material conditions of any given political 
economy. 
170
                                                          
167. Several inaugural queer texts were born out of material economies of death, desire, and power.  
See, e.g., LEE EDELMAN, HOMOGRAPHESIS: ESSAYS IN GAY LITERARY AND CULTURAL THEORY (1994); 
D.A. MILLER, THE NOVEL AND THE POLICE (1988); CINDY PATTON, INVENTING AIDS (1990); 
SEDGWICK, supra note 
) 
Granted, his is not an effort to ground identity in injury, as Walker and Halley 
accuse feminist and civil rights folks of doing. But their characterization is 
certainly subject to dispute. Others, myself included, would argue that justice 
projects get painted with too broad a brush (or, in Walker’s case, cut too 
coarsely). For instance, political projects such as Bersani’s focused on positive 
rights and access to resources to combat the lethal reach of AIDS. Other 
projects similarly sound in the register of distributive justice. Contemporary 
examples of identity politics not rooted in injury might include demands for 
language accommodation or disability rights. Hence, the search for minoritized 
91. Following Hortense Spillers, Robyn Wiegman distinguishes the “epistemic 
shift” of identity as it transitions from its origins in social movements to academic enterprise. Wiegman, 
supra note 94, at 94. Born of AIDS outrage and seeking a politics, yet yearning for scholarly legitimacy, 
Is the Rectum a Grave? might represent such a transitional text. 
168. See, e.g., MIKE DAVIS, CITY OF QUARTZ: EXCAVATING THE FUTURE IN LOS ANGELES (1990); 
SUSAN HANSON & GERALDINE PRATT, GENDER, WORK, AND SPACE (1995); HENRI LEFEBVRE, THE 
SURVIVAL OF CAPITALISM: REPRODUCTION OF THE RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION (1976); DOUGLAS S. 
MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE 
UNDERCLASS (1993); LINDA MCDOWELL, GENDER, IDENTITY AND PLACE: UNDERSTANDING FEMINIST 
GEOGRAPHIES (1999); EDWARD W. SOJA, POSTMODERN GEOGRAPHIES: THE REASSERTION OF SPACE IN 
CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY (1989). 
169. See, e.g., GEORGE CHAUNCEY, GAY NEW YORK: GENDER, URBAN CULTURE, AND THE 
MAKINGS OF THE GAY MALE WORLD 1890-1940, 162 (1994) (“A male couple sharing a room, or a 
respectable-looking male hotel guest taking another man to his room for a few hours, aroused less 
suspicion on the part of desk clerks. . . . A few hotels, such as the St. George in Brooklyn, developed a 
reputation for their willingness to accommodate gay men on a short- or long-term basis, but gay men 
could use a larger number of them surreptitiously.”). 
170. In a classic indictment of the media’s role in producing heterosexual hysteria and anxiety as a 
response to AIDS, Bersani noted: “Thus the family identity produced on American television is much 
more likely to include your dog than your homosexual brother or sister.” Bersani, supra note 76, at 203. 
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identity rooted in injury is only one among many strains of such politics, 
several of which share common cause with Bersani’s own efforts to theorize a 
common, cohesive identity and its politics.171
Finally, it is worth giving some attention to the role of consent in 
subversive abjection. Consent, while a finely guarded liberal principle, has 
reached its greatest heights in feminist theory. This is one of the regulatory 
forces that Halley wants us to Take a Break from and that Walker rather 
brutally parodies in her installations. (Consent appears irrelevant in Walker’s 
slavery tableaux, perhaps because of its associations with regulatory projects 
she disdains.) Yet, the subversive potential, indeed, the very logic of, Bersani’s 
abjection lies in the consent of the penetrated. Both the threat and the political 
possibility of abjection lie in the “widespread confusion in heterosexual and 
homosexual men between fantasies of anal and vaginal sex.”
 In short, Bersani’s is explicitly a 
justice claim, an anti-subordination and identity manifesto grounded in 
resistance to economies of death in the gay male health crisis. 
172 Bersani argues 
heterosexual intercourse provides the social map for sex and power, in which 
women are passive receptacles and men are active conquerors. Even when on 
top, “To be penetrated is to abdicate power.”173 Importantly, in such a 
construction, “gay” takes its social meaning not from its same-sex character but 
from its association with passivity and the female role, from the willingness to 
become penetrated and despised.174 Yet, neither the vagina nor its imagined 
anal analog is conceived as powerless, vulnerable, and inviolable. Rather, both 
are imagined as the antithesis of the penis, imminently able to perform, 
insatiable, and hence promiscuous, if not properly tamed and regulated.175 For 
Bersani, the crucial analogy is to prostitutes, who “publicize (indeed, sell) the 
inherent aptitude of women for uninterrupted sex.”176 (Thus the critical border 
between “wife” and “prostitute,” apparently invented and then violently 
guarded in so many societies.) If marriage represents the satiated vagina, the 
controlled and domesticated woman, then, like prostitutes, gay men are 
untamed by marriage, unregulated by monogamy, and, governed by their 
insatiability, will murder us all.177
                                                          
171. Ranjana Khanna emphasizes that Bersani does not fall prey to the “wounded attachments” 
criticized by Wendy Brown. Khanna, supra note 
 “[P]romiscuity in this fantasy, far from 
104, at 79. 
172. Bersani, supra note 76, at 211. 
173. Id. at 212. See also Khanna, supra note 104, at 73 (noting that “Bersani insists on the value of 
the subordinate position”) (footnote omitted). 
174. Certainly Bersani was not the first or only to note this. See, e.g., ROGER N. LANCASTER, LIFE 
IS HARD: MACHISMO, DANGER, AND THE INTIMACY OF POWER IN NICARAGUA 235-52 (1994) 
(describing male sexualities through the prism of machismo and active/passive sexual roles). 
175. Both engender suspicion and hostility as the antithesis of the penis, requiring no stimulation to 
perform and with unending stamina. “Tragically, AIDS . . . . has reinforced the heterosexual association 
of anal sex with a self-annihilation originally and primarily identified with the fantasmatic mystery of an 
insatiable, unstoppable female sexuality.” Bersani, supra note 76, at 222. 
176. Id. at 211. 
177. “[T]he similarities between representations of female prostitutes and male homosexuals should 
help us to specify the exact form of sexual behavior being targeted, in representations of AIDS, as the 
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merely increasing the risk of infection, is the sign of infection. Women and gay 
men spread their legs with an unquenchable appetite for destruction.”178 The 
political possibility lies in the active abdication, the purposeful relinquishment, 
of control over the margin, the limit, the boundary and border. It comes from 
the way that gay men voluntarily take on the role of women, not the ways that 
any man can be forced to assume this role through sexual violence.179 In the 
voluntary inequality lies the threat, and, crucial to Bersani’s argument, the 
subversive potential as well.180
Of course, one could make the case for the possibility of sexual pleasure in 
non-consensual acts. Similarly, one could argue the imminent rape-ability of 
both gay men and straight women. But that is not where Bersani locates his 
political potential. Rather, it is in the body’s seeking its own annihilation, its 
own debasement. (Recall Bersani’s muse is the prostitute, not the rape victim). 
His emphasis on sex as self-abolition, self-debasement, self-annihilation 
assumes the solicitation, the invitation, in other words, the consent to, the 
“ecstatic suffering.”
 
181 The meaning of anal eroticism here comes in 
relinquishing control over this margin, this precious limit, that has taken on so 
much social meaning. Countering “redemptive projects” requires embracing the 
liberatory potential in voluntary inequality.182
In sum, Bersani’s subversive abjection is a justice project accompanied by 
a discourse of minoritized identity, anti-subordination, and attention to material 
economies of power. Without question, equality and identity lie at the heart of 
his subversive notion of abjection. Perhaps Halley is rendering Bersani as a 
silhouette. (Indeed, perhaps the persona of Ian is a silhouette?) While both 
Walker and Halley invoke a political possibility in abjection as an alternative 
mode of conceiving bodies and power, neither appears interested in these 
aspects of subversive abjection. (In fact, Halley rejects this as the part of 
 
                                                          
criminal, fatal, and irresistibly repeated act.” Id. For eclectic discussions of women as sexual agents, see 
generally Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 11 COLUM. L. 
REV. 181 (2001); Susan Ekberg Stiritz, Cultural Cliteracy: Exposing the Contexts of Women’s Not 
Coming, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 243 (2008); PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING 
FEMALE SEXUALITY, supra note 79. 
178. Bersani, Is the Rectum a Grave?, supra note 76, at 211 (footnote omitted). 
179. Marc Spindelman makes related points about consent in the gay community. “If gay men like 
Lawrence and Garner, and perhaps lesbian women as well, are not persons who might be violated 
through same-sex sex, what does it mean for them to say ‘yes’ to sex when they do?” Spindelman, 
Surviving Lawrence, supra note 4, at 661. 
180. Ranjana Khanna proposes melancholia in lieu of disavowal. “Halley, following Bersani, sees a 
politics derived from the dissolution of the self as something peculiar to homosexuality rather than to 
melancholia more generally.” Khanna, supra note 104, at 74, 83 (footnote omitted). 
181. Bersani, Is the Rectum a Grave?, supra note 76, at 218. 
182. In some ways Kristeva’s articulation of abjection captures Walker’s and Halley’s interest in 
the jouissance of straying onto forbidden ground. Classic abjection articulates the compulsion and 
fascination with what has been left behind—the sense of belonging and community that can come 
through discarding. Hence there is a way in which classic abjection is about belonging and subjectivity, 
if not justice and identity. 
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Bersani that capitulates to feminism’s governance.183
The next Section suggests some limits to Halley’s project specific to law, 
feminism, and regulatory projects. At some moments, it uses Walker to do so. 
) Rectifying queer injury 
is at the heart of Bersani’s project. Without it, Bersani’s abjection loses its 
meaning and power as a queer text. Or, put another way, without consent, 
abjection may lose its subversive expressive dimensions. One might argue 
(persuasively) that Halley just got her texts wrong. That she really intended to 
invoke Kristevan classic abjection, the yearning for that which is lost and 
expelled. But she is very explicit in her claims about Bersani. And she 
explicitly calls for the liberatory potential in shame and degradation over 
equality, anti-subordination, and dignity, as an alternative first principle. 
Hence, Halley’s call for sexual abjection finds some limits precisely in the 
queer theory she turns to. In the end, abjection seems more helpful as 
psychoanalysis than as politics. 
III. SEXUALITY EXCEPTIONALISM 
Thus far this Article has emphasized convergences between Halley and 
Walker’s projects. Now I’d like to consider some meaningful differences.  
Walker’s aesthetic vision disdains and disclaims the juridical imperative, the 
solely subordinating vision of sex and race, seeking to enable and urge a 
different vision of bodies and power. Her textual claims, primarily in 
interviews, go even further, disclaiming what Halley would call “minoritized 
identity” based on injury.184 In both media, Walker’s arguments are primarily 
ones about human subjectivity, particularly its racialized and sexualized 
dimensions (recall her desire to encourage women to participate in stories that 
are “not in their best interests.”185
                                                          
183. She makes a similar charge against Duncan Kennedy’s Sexy Dressing. Both this and Bersani 
are examples of what Halley calls “queer theory by men.” Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 
). However, whatever her impatience with 
civil rights fetishism, Walker stops short of calling for its end, for a return to 
pre-civil rights racial relations, or for “Taking a Break from Civil Rights.” 
Indeed, her claims do not appear to be regulatory ones. Rather, she seems most 
interested in exploring the spaces opened up by civil rights and its 
transformation of race, of changing racial subjectivity in the shadow of these 
3, 
at 15, 18 (discussing Bersani’s “unusually strongminded embrace of abjection” and how his interests are 
those of gay men, not women); see also id. at 29 (discussing how Kennedy’s work is not feminist and is 
in fact taken only from his perspective as a white middle class male by “affirm[ing] that men (even those 
who don’t abuse women) eroticize women’s subordination, suspect[ing] that women do too, and 
acknowledging multiple male interests in the underenforcement of rules against men’s sexual abuse of 
women.”); Khanna, supra note 104, at 72-73; 77-78 (offering an alternative description of Bersani and 
Kennedy’s relationships to feminism). 
184. See supra note 3. 
185. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
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new spaces. Considering the limits of Walker’s claims is useful in deriving the 
scope of Halley’s and their import for law and legal theory. 
In contrast to Walker, Halley’s embrace of abjection seeks to clear not only 
conceptual but regulatory space. Halley states: “I hope to show that 
left/liberal/progressives can Take a Break from Feminism in their theorizing, 
their alliance formation, and their activism from time to time, and that the 
results can be (not that they must be—only that they can be) good, not only for 
projects that fall outside the domain of feminism, but for feminism, too.”186
What is both seductive and frustrating about the TBF project is it is so very 
difficult to pin Halley down on the nature and scope of her normative claims or 
regulatory vision.
 But 
what, exactly, is the nature of Halley’s regulatory claims? How does abjection 
go from an account of human exclusion and belonging (Kristeva) and a basis 
for an identitarian politics (Bersani) to the engine for dismantling a regulatory 
regime? In other words, what is the connection between Halley’s embrace of 
abjection and her break from feminist-inflected sexual regulation? 
187 There is a contemporaneous and slightly later set of essays 
on “Governance Feminism” at work in the international context, but I do not 
take these to be part of the TBF project, nor do they appear in the Split 
Decisions monograph.188 (I exclude them from consideration here as part of my 
interlocution with TBF because they give a quite different account of both 
“Governance Feminism” and feminism itself, and they do not iterate feminism 
as in tension with other projects of sexual liberation.189
                                                          
186. Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 
) Instead, in much of the 
3, at 9. 
187. Robin West characterizes them as “dystopian imaginings.” West, supra note 4, at 44.  
Elsewhere West says, “Readers of Halley’s work do not often encounter straightforward, empirical 
claims about the amount, types, or intensities of sexual harms in the world. Rather, what one more often 
sees in Halley’s writing is a hermeneutic of interpretation, not an empirical claim, regarding sexual 
harms.” Id. at 30-31. Mary Anne Case made the opposite observation, contrasting Walker’s nostalgia 
with Halley’s utopianism. Telephone Conversation with Mary Anne Case, Arnold I. Shure Professor of 
Law, University of Chicago Law School (August 2010). If Walker looks firmly backwards to question 
our aesthetic and political present, Halley looks resolutely forward, to a future compelling in its 
contours, but that remains empty of substantive content. 
188. See Janet Halley, Rape at Rome: Feminist Interventions in the Criminalization of Sex-Related 
Violence in Positive International Criminal Law, 30 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Halley, 
Rape at Rome]; Janet Halley, Rape in Berlin: Reconsidering the Criminalisation of Rape in the 
International Law of Armed Conflict, 9 MELB. J. INT’L L. 78 (2008) [hereinafter Halley, Rape in Berlin]; 
Janet Halley et al., From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, 
Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 335 (2006) [hereinafter Halley et al., Four Studies in Contemporary Governance 
Feminism]. These essays are fascinating, and I commend them to anyone interested in understanding the 
richness and complexities of Halley’s claims. 
189. But here, again, we find the ambiguity: an interlocution of “governance feminists” versus 
feminism per se. The Governance Feminism, or what she dubs, GFeminism, essays criticize the 
collaboration of a newly emergent feminism with nationalism (“In nationalist normativity, only sheer 
domination—only the designation ‘rape’—makes women’s sex with a wartime enemy tolerable”) and its 
alliance with what Martha McClusky has termed the incarceral state to pursue a criminal mode of 
abolition and prohibition of rape in wartime. Martha McClusky, Comment at Injury and Distribution: An 
Inquiry into the State of Our Art on Sex, Sexuality, Gender and the Family (Nov.r 20-22, 2003). 
  These essays define “governance feminism” differently than do the TBF essays. They do not 
adhere to the “minimalist” definition of feminism that characterizes all of the TBF pieces. Instead, these 
DAVIS BAD GIRLS OF ART & LAW.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 6/8/2011  9:00 AM 
144 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. XX:NNN 
formal TBF essays Halley’s disavowal remains abstract. It is clear she has a 
beef with feminism’s governance, i.e., its vision and its alliance with the state 
on matters ranging from sexual harassment to rape, but, apart from tantalizing 
statements like, “why don’t we consider rape as a long slow punch in the face,” 
it is difficult to know what is in her crosshairs.190
What follows is my effort to take seriously Halley’s call for a break from 
feminism, but to do so within her own logic, that is, a logic that seeks to 
distance itself from minoritized identity projects and their equality and anti-
subordination principles to embrace abjection as an alternative liberatory 
politics of the left. 
 Halley argues that feminism 
has been guilty of both identitarian and governance harms, i.e., that its 
construal of sex and power has actually been productive of injury, inducing 
women to embrace a victimized identity, and the regulatory salve itself has 
been too concentrated, foreclosing other sexual goals. Let’s concede for the 
moment the identitarian fear about women’s internalization of injured identity. 
In other words, for the moment, let’s assume that Halley is correct, that 
feminism’s verb form injunction to “survive” and its noun-form lauding of 
“survivors” has exacerbated rather than ameliorated the psychic injuries of 
rape. Now let’s explore her second argument, that feminist-initiated reforms of 
sexual assault governance have themselves imposed substantial costs, shutting 
down other sexual goals interested in liberatory versus reciprocal and 
egalitarian sex. 
                                                          
essays differentiate feminisms with distinctly different investments, distinguishing “structural,” 
“individualist,” and “radical” versions of feminism and inquiring which “strands” of feminism “docked” 
more successfully in Governance Feminism’s alliance with state power. In addition, in these essays 
Governance Feminism itself appears more as a political and tactical mode of interaction and 
engagement, a management style, and/or an Eriksonian life cycle for feminism. It is “a new feminist 
organizational style that has evolved over the course of the 1990s” characterized by its “multiplicity, 
mobility, fragmentation, a regulatory or bureaucratic legal style, as well as ready facility with non-state 
and para-state institutional forms (NGO’s, law school clinics, ad hoc expert groups doing letter writing 
campaigns)” and its “institutionalization” of feminist achievements. As a life cycle, Halley perceptively 
notes that it is “feminism grown up, professionalized, and adept at wielding power” and a “newly mature 
engagement with power.” Again, crucial to the Governance Feminism project is that it encompasses 
different kinds of feminism. Finally, none of the Governance Feminism essays call for a “break” from 
feminism, or even hint at it. Indeed, instead of calling for a break, her essay on rape in war and sex 
trafficking with Thomas, Shamir, and Kotiswaran identifies an “exciting new research paradigm for 
feminists and nonfeminists alike.” In sum, these projects seem to enjoin feminists to realize and come to 
terms with its accumulated hard-won power, to envision ourselves as rulers. Halley, Rape in Berlin, 
supra note 188, at 106; Halley, Rape at Rome, supra note 188, at 3, 2, 18, 39; Halley et al., Four Studies 
in Contemporary Governance Feminism, supra note 188, at 336, 341, 340 (emphasis added). 
190. Within the TBF project, her most substantive critique is interpreting a domestic 
violence/marital rape case as a sex panic. Each of the TBF essays includes almost identical analysis of 
Twyman v. Twyman. Taking a Break to Decide (II), in HALLEY, supra note 4, at 348-63; Halley, in Is 
Feminist Theory Enough?, supra note 56, at  611-17; Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 39-
48; Halley, Take a Break from Feminism?, supra note 56, at 68-78. The Split Decisions book also 
includes an analysis of a Supreme Court decision on same-sex sexual harassment, updated from a pre-
TBF article. HALLEY, supra note 4, at 290-303 (revising discussion of Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Services Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), from Halley’s Sexuality Harassment essay, supra note 56, at 189-93); 
see also Halley, in Subversive Legal Moments?, supra note 56 (in roundtable discussion of other 
germinal sex equality cases, raising concerns about sex panics). 
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First, sex seems to occupy a curiously abstract, yet deeply essentialist line 
in Halley’s accounting, one surprisingly Freudian in fact. Sex appears sacred, 
essential to the self, irrational perhaps, and hence exempt from regulation, 
perhaps even unregulatable. This syncs well with biological notions of sex as a 
“natural drive,” one that is pre-social and universal. (Evidence here includes the 
fact that babies masturbate and get erections.) It is a Freudian monolith, an 
oddly pre-Foucauldian rendering of sex as “repressed” and in need of 
“liberation.” (Indeed if, following Foucault’s mandate, we cannot meaningfully 
distinguish between repression and production of sex, it is unclear how a queer-
based “regulation,” or “non-regulation,” would liberate it.) Absent is a sense of 
the multiple uses and appearances of sex, not only as conventional “pleasure” 
or “intimacy,” but as work in labor markets; an object of both production and 
consumption in media of all sorts (pornography, advertising, entertainment); a 
technique of population management and discipline (à la Agambens and 
Foucault); a strategy of political discipline and destruction; an intensely 
regulated resource in processes of personal and social reproduction; a contested 
scarce resource for some populations (i.e., the disabled); or as a metric for 
distributing resources.191
It’s odd, then, to argue that if there are markets for sex, they could not be 
regulated as other labor or consumption is, because of sex’s essential, Freudian 
meaning. Or that populations struggling to contain AIDS and other health 
threats cannot properly include sexuality as an object of public health 
innovation. Or that scrutiny of the techniques of the camp or the prison (or the 
plantation for that matter) would exclude and exempt sex.
 In all of these, sex is deeply material, intensely 
economic, linked to populations and their access to distributive justice and 
cultivation of capabilities. 
192
                                                          
191. An essay on international governance feminism that Halley co-authored with Prabha 
Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir, and Chantal Thomas gives explicit attention to distributive concerns.  
However, the essay attributes sections to the authors separately, and the other authors focus more on the 
distributive contexts and consequences, Halley more on indicting governance feminism. Halley et al., 
Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, supra note 
 Positing sex as 
more connected with the self than other acts or endeavors—labor, reproduction, 
production, consumption—and making this the basis of its exemption from 
regulation and from governance, seems such a curious call for Halley to 
embrace. (Much as it would be odd to contend that the excesses of OSHA or 
labor unions mean we should Take a Break from Labor Regulation.) All law is 
a governance project. I fear that for all of its bona fides TBF falls prey to a 
view of sex as exceptional, that is, distinctive (and distinguished) from other 
188, at 337 (“We take it as a given, 
for a distributively focused legal analysis, that punishing conduct as crime does not ‘stop’ or ‘end’ it, as 
governance feminists . . . sometimes seem to imagine.”) (emphasis added). 
192. See, e.g., GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE (1998) 
(contending that modern sovereign power operates via biopolitics, or managing the very fact of life and 
death, as manifest in the camp); MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 
(Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) (arguing that the prison and its perpetual surveillance is the archetype of 
modern sovereign power). 
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market and political relations, beyond rational analysis, and exempt from 
meaningful regulation.193
A second way of thinking about these anti-governance claims is through 
the lens of costs, not of regulating sex, but of sex itself. As my former 
colleague Richard Myers put it, consensual and non-consensual sex used to 
impose similar, or at least comparable, “costs.”
 We might call this excepting and exempting 
“sexuality exceptionalism.” 
194 These included unwanted 
pregnancy, unknown paternity, and, of course, disease. Yet the increasing 
availability and acceptability of birth control, abortion, and condoms, all public 
health techniques, plus DNA testing for paternity, have significantly altered the 
equation. One result of this “technology innovation” was to lower significantly 
the consequential costs of consensual sex, particularly with regard to disease 
and pregnancy, thereby creating a significant disparity between the costs of 
consensual and nonconsensual sex. In the face of this striking disparity, and the 
lowered costs of consensual sex, Halley’s call to end, or break from, the 
feminist-inflected consent principle of sexual governance is curious. The 
technological “cost reduction,” a key component of “liberating” sex, alongside 
the reduction in its moral costs authored by feminist, queer, and other sex-
positive movements, relies on both a certain rationality about sex, that is, its 
articulation as a technique of abating human misery and enhancing human 
capability, not merely as a source of pleasure or technique of morality, and its 
contextualization within political economies (or what I have elsewhere called 
sexual political economies195
                                                          
193. Adam Romero concurs that “Halley should leave the take-a-break-from-feminism rhetoric 
behind.”  Romero, supra note 
). In this sense, abating nonconsensual sex and 
sexual violence is a technique of distributive justice, not meaningfully different 
from abatement of famine, illiteracy, poverty, disease, and unwanted 
pregnancy.  (This is quickly illustrated by the fact that both rape and consensual 
but unsafe sex have been key contributors to the AIDS crisis in underdeveloped 
countries. Consider the intensely controversial “Real Men Don’t Tolerate 
Rape” campaign in South Africa as part of the anti-AIDS campaign which 
4, at 229. 
194. Conversation with Richard Myers (Fall 2007). 
195. Adrienne Davis, Don’t Let Nobody Bother Yo’ Principle: The Sexual Economy of American 
Slavery, in SISTER CIRCLE: BLACK WOMEN AND WORK 103, 120 (2002) (“[E]nslaved black women 
shared the world of productive labor with white men, black men, and white women but also inhabited a 
separate world of compelled sexual and reproductive labor. By understanding American slavery as a 
sexual economy in which black women’s reproduction and sexuality were appropriated for any number 
of white economic and political interests, we can see more clearly how slavery was a deeply gendered 
and sexualized institution in which there was a constant interplay between black sexuality and white 
economic profits. Such an understanding collapses the distinctions we draw between sex and work, 
families and markets, also showing how this distinction was itself largely under male control.”); 
Adrienne D. Davis, Slavery and the Roots of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT LAW, supra note 4, at 460-61 (“Designating slavery a sexual political economy makes 
explicit the connection among its markets, labor structure, and sexual exploitation. It also directs 
attention toward the ways that New World slavery’s geographic manifestation, the plantation, was 
particularly hospitable to institutionalized sexual abuse and coercion of women in the black 
workforce.”). 
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emerged alongside the more conventional approach to push condoms with 
consensual sex.196
Relatedly, calls to view rape as “like any other bodily assault” (i.e., the 
long punch in the face), like the implication that people might revel in its 
liberatory possibilities, ironically exceptionalize it. They seem to suggest that 
law enforcement could not subject sexual violence to the same forensic scrutiny 
they apply to homicide, home invasion, arson, or securities fraud. In fact, 
discerning what motivates, and hence deters, perpetrators requires some focus 
on their crime and its motivations. Calls to wrap rape into non-sexual assault 
will definitionally miss why rapists rape, which is almost certainly different 
than why burglars burgle, serial killers kill, and arsonists burn. In Split 
Decisions, Halley asks whether feminism’s emphasis on sexual violence has 
recruited women to suffer: “What if the politics of injury and of traumatized 
sensibility that have almost completely occupied the space cleared by 
MacKinnon’s politics of domination and subordination are helping to authorize 
and enable women as sufferers?”
) I fear that to ignore the shift to consent and the 
accompanying liberation of sex invites a return to a regime in which higher cost 
sex is viewed and treated the same as lower cost sex, that is, beyond the reach 
of capabilities enhancement and shielded by shame from scrutiny. With this 
disparity precarious, and the costs of consensual sex again on the rise, it is an 
odd time to urge the end of governance of sex, or to govern it solely towards its 
liberatory and shameful potential. 
197 These critiques focus on the victim, or, if I 
may, the object of sexual assault. Yet criminal law typically focuses its 
regulatory energy on perpetrators. (In fact, as Robin West notes, there is a 
curious lack of perpetrators in the TBF project.198
Third, Halley’s argument de-materializes power in an intriguing and 
perhaps unanticipated way. She appears to suggest that law sacrifices too much 
when it takes account of institutional or cultural power disparities in crafting 
sexual regulatory regimes. For instance, she questions the sexual governance of 
status-based power differentials, such as teacher/student, boss/underling, 
guard/prisoner.
) To re-focus attention on the 
victims and why they suffer is, again, an exceptionalizing move. Similarly, 
contending that sexual components of crimes are unworthy of their own 
forensics is to exceptionalize those acts from all others. 
199
                                                          
196. See, e.g., Corrina Schuler, A Voice Against Rape Rattles South Africa, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Oct. 13, 1999, at 1 (describing how South Africa’s advertising regulator pulled controversial 
“real men don’t rape” commercials off the air). 
 The left’s relationship with power is obviously complex. Yet, 
I think it is safe to say that a focus on power and its distributional effects are 
two key tenets of the left. In fact, a sustained, some would say unrelenting, 
analysis of power is much of what distinguishes “left” from “liberal” 
197. HALLEY, supra note 4, at 345. 
198. West, supra note 4, at 34-35, 41. 
199. Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 13. 
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approaches to law and policy. After all, what is the difference between police 
brutality and a bar fight? Certainly, the unrelenting analysis of power is a core 
tenet of the critical legal studies movement that has so influenced both me and 
Halley: “[E]very time you bring a case and win a right, that right is integrated 
within an ideological framework that has as its ultimate aim the maintenance of 
collective passivity. That doesn’t mean you don’t bring the case—it means you 
keep your eye on power and not on rights.”200 Hence it is hard not to contrast 
Halley’s call to break with these critiques of power against Bersani’s material 
focus on the distributive effects of power in 1980s San Francisco and its bodies 
withering of AIDS. For Bersani, this generated a hatred, a rage, and a call to 
action. But in the TBF project, the material and distributional context of bodies 
disappears.201
Fourth, given Halley’s professed alignments with queer approaches, the 
TBF project is curiously identitarian. In Sexuality Harassment and Split 
Decisions, she contrasts “gay” with “queer” conceptions of sexuality.
 Bodies are notable for their capacity for liberatory pleasure, but 
not much beyond that. In disdaining feminism’s engagement with power, either 
Halley is rejecting this key tenet of the legal left, or she is arguing that power is 
somehow exempt from scrutiny when bound up with sex, or (again) sexuality 
exceptionalism. 
202 Halley 
characterizes gay theory as endorsing stable, dichotomous identities, including 
heterosexual/homosexual, and lesbian women/gay men as “very different.”203 
She contends that queer theory, on the other hand, regards the very idea of 
gender and other stable identities with “some skepticism even resentment,” 
thereby presumptively rejecting differences between het/homo, as well as 
lesbians and gay men, and instead encouraging contingent and alternate sexual 
identities along dimensions other than the sex of the object of desire.204 Yet 
recall that in her own early foray into TBF, Halley’s embrace of abjection is 
rooted in queer theory only by men. In that crucial, provocative essay, authored 
by Ian,  Halley identified her politics as aligned with “Queer Theory by Men,” 
appearing thereby to want no truck with the work of Eve Sedgwick, Judith 
Butler, Gayle Rubin, and other leading queer theorists who are not biologically 
male.205
                                                          
200. Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1, 36 (1984). 
 (Indeed, I suspect Kristeva comes closer to Halley’s rejection of the 
coherent sexual subject than does Bersani.) Robyn Wiegman is concerned, in 
201. Mary Anne Franks also takes Halley to task for failing to live up to a truly “left” spirit of 
interrogation and engagement. Franks, supra note 4, at 257-59, 263 (noting Halley’s project is “meant to 
be a leftist one” and charging her with “depoliticized” and “decontextualized” analysis and claims). 
202. Halley, Sexuality Harassment, supra note 56, at 193-94; see also HALLEY, supra note 4, at 
112-14. 
203. Halley, Sexuality Harassment, supra note 56, at 194. 
204. HALLEY, supra note 4, at 113. 
205. Adam Romero’s review of Split Decisions offers a helpful consideration of Butler’s resistance 
to disaggregating feminist and queer theories. Romero, supra note 4, at 255-56. As noted above, the 
Split Decisions monograph does complicate this early, identitarian stance. See supra note 95. 
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fact, that Halley participates in the “traffic in gay men.”206
[W]hy does the queer sexual imaginary that you seek seem to require 
for its startling, sexy, divergentist appeal a model and mode of sexual, 
social, and psychic definition based on identifications with gay men? 
Is it because the figure of the lesbian is now so overwhelmed by her 
proximity to feminism, where she has trafficked in a kind of self-
production that many have come to disavow, that only her absence can 
open the project to sexual and theoretical imagination and a 
transformed future?
 In her essay, styled 
as a letter to Ian Halley, she asks Janet/Ian: 
207
The effect is to privilege the very identitarianism and dimorphic gender 
Halley seeks to disavow through queer theory while evacuating lesbian 
sexuality, theory, and politics from her version of “queer.” Hence parts of the 
TBF project manifest an odd adherence to the very idea of the stable gender 
dimorphism Halley wants to escape. Crucially, this gender identitarian 
distinction is not one that is drawn within queer theory. (This is also 
reminiscent of Walker, whose silhouettes and tableaux I noted take on their 
racial meaning precisely by relying on and executing the same racial 
stereotypes she resists.) Hence, there is an odd quality to Halley’s simultaneous 
disavowal and yet intermittent reification of dimorphic gender identification. 
 
Finally, I’d like to consider Halley’s work in light of Walker’s to identify a 
latent tension in the TBF essays. Walker’s tableaux demonstrate that racial 
degradation and subordination can be sources of intense bodily pleasure, 
including sexual pleasure. (Indeed, Walker’s work is characterized by its 
foregrounding of the sexually and racially abject body.) In more recent 
installations about lynching, she depicts the sexual pleasures of racial 
degradation and violence, echoing what several cultural critics have articulated 
in scholarly form.208
                                                          
206. See supra note 
 Where Walker departs from these scholarly critiques and 
133. See also Khanna, supra note 104, at 71 (discussing what was lost or 
gained in Halley’s “substitution of Janet for Ian, and the constitution of the self sometimes proposed in 
the proffering of a signature.”). 
 
 Queer Theory by Men tries to have its cake and eat it too by on the one hand offering a 
  compelling commitment to the most profound and to my mind productive anti-identitarian 
  impulses of queer theory, while enacting, on the other hand, its rebellion against feminism in 
  a performative grammar of identitarian attachment to the belligerent bodies (yes, I’ll say it) of 
  variously embodied men. 
 
Wiegman, Dear Ian, supra note 94, at 95. 
207. Id. at 110. In her “letter” to Ian Halley, Wiegman asks “How anti-identitarian are you, finally, 
if your retreat from governance feminism is nominated Queer Theory By Men?” and “Can a pro-sex, 
shame affirmative, self-shattering, and anti-domestic sexual imaginary be pursued if lesbians remain in 
the room?” Id. at 105, 96. 
208. JACQUELINE GOLDSBY, A SPECTACULAR SECRET: LYNCHING IN AMERICAN LIFE AND 
LITERATURE 219 (2006) (discussing “traffic in lynching photographs”); TRUDIER HARRIS, EXORCISING 
BLACKNESS: HISTORICAL AND LITERARY LYNCHING AND BURNING RITUALS 23, 21-24 (1984) 
(describing how “the lynched black man becomes a source of sexual pleasure to those who kill him”); 
Robyn Wiegman, The Anatomy of Lynching, 3 J. OF THE HIST. OF SEXUALITY 445, 446 (1993) (“[N]ot 
only does lynching enact a grotesquely symbolic—if not literal—sexual encounter between the white 
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joins with Halley is in her far more provocative claim, that racial humiliation 
and degradation could also serve as a source of sexual pleasure for blacks, the 
abjected bodies, as well. Hence Walker’s art seizes upon this discomforting 
element of our national history—the racial erotics of lynching—and pushes it 
even farther, arguably into Halley’s terrain. 
Walker’s aesthetic projections raise some questions for the TBF project. 
Halley contends that feminism’s regulatory impulses are at odds with queer 
theory’s interests in sexual possibility, including the liberatory possibility of 
non-reciprocal, shameful, and degrading sex. But Walker’s silhouettes illustrate 
that the body’s capacity for pleasures derived from shame, humiliation, and 
degradation is expansive.209 Sixty years ago, Frantz Fanon identified the 
psychoanalytic roots of racial pleasures, neatly deconstructing the purported 
dichotomy between sex as “natural” and race as “constructed.”210
There is an ambivalence in the essays as to the scope of Halley’s proposed 
“Break”—is it a Break from all justice projects or merely from feminism? At 
some points Halley proclaims that the Break is limited to, as the project and 
book title suggest, feminism. For instance, while Halley prefers power 
feminism over cultural feminism, which she finds “repellent,” she believes 
“that it might sometimes be good to Take a Break from both forms of 
feminism.”
 Following 
Fanon, Walker’s aesthetic projections radically expand Halley’s sexual claims 
into the racial arena. Halley has distanced herself from the conventional justice 
critiques of oppression and injury. With no anti-subordination principle in 
place, Walker’s identification of the racial and other erotics of subordination 
put the question squarely to her: what is the scope of her desired break from 
justice projects? And what, exactly, is her relationship to pleasure? 
211
                                                          
mob and its victim, but the increasing use of castration as a preferred form of mutilation for African 
American men demonstrates lynching’s connection to the sociosymbolic realm of sexual difference.”). 
At others, she joins forces with political theorist Wendy Brown to 
209. Of course, we could pose the same question of other justice projects as well. Most obviously, 
if homophobia is a source of bodily pleasure, as it surely is, should it, too, be condoned? I think here of 
Ted Haggard, Senator Larry Craig, and Congressman Mark Foley as only the most recent exemplars of 
public homophobes and anti-gay activists who engaged in closeted same-sex practices. Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick terms this desire-triggered homophobia homosexual panic. SEDGWICK, supra note 91, at 182-
212. See, e.g., Andrew Chung, The Elephant in the Room, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 2, 2007, at 1D; 
Timothy Patrick McCarthy, Homos, Hypocrites, Haters, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 9, 2007, at 
H-1. 
210. FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS (Charles Lam Markmann trans., 1967) (1952). 
More recently, David Eng also uses psychoanalytic theory to show that “sexuality is not natural—that it 
is resolutely cultural and constructed.” DAVID L. ENG, RACIAL CASTRATION: MANAGING MASCULINITY 
IN ASIAN AMERICA 14 (2001); see also Wagner, supra note 11, at 98-99 (discussing Fanon in context of 
Walker’s work); Anthony P. Farley, Black Body as Fetish Object, 76 OR. L. REV. 457, 474 (1997) 
(discussing Fanon’s view that the “colorline . . . , like sexuality, gives one’s body a thematic structure”). 
To take a very small example of racial pleasures and hierarchies, recessive genes such as light skin and 
blue eyes are treasured in many cultures. 
211. HALLEY, supra note 4, at 41. 
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query, in effect, since when did the left get in bed with the state?212 Is Halley 
calling for relinquishing the state’s regulatory role any time pleasure is 
possible? Or, are the claims limited to gender justice projects? If the former, 
broader version of the claim, TBF seems to be calling for a consistent 
privileging of the possibility of pleasure in abjection and subordination over 
equality and justice.213 Which then raises the next question—what is it that 
makes her project “left”? Why is it not merely part of the vast anti-identitarian 
and anti-equality zeitgeist that characterizes “right” (and many liberal) projects 
today?214
Which leads me to be curious about the implications of Halley’s 
injunctions for the queer theoretical project itself. Some interesting recent work 
in queer theory directs its attention to questions of how race and other 
categories inflect the distribution of power and the meaning of acts in queer 
life. I think here of critiques ranging from the racialization of sex and power 
 If TBF is limited to the latter, more literal interpretation—as a break 
solely from feminism—why? Without a guiding principle, some mechanism 
distinguishing between the liberatory value in bodily pleasures deriving from 
conventionally sexual acts versus other sexual and bodily pleasures, Halley’s 
entire project is susceptible to a sort of gender essentialism, or a claim that sex 
is more “special” than (or prior to?) other bodily functions and pleasures. In 
short, if we are to disavow some regulatory regimes but not others, embrace 
some bodily pleasures but not others, what is the guiding principle? Can we 
articulate it, without devolving into sexuality exceptionalism? 
                                                          
212. See also Halley, The Politics of Injury, supra note 73, at 65 (characterizing feminism as part of 
larger LMIPST projects, i.e., “left-multicultural identity-political subordination-theory . . . projects” that 
include “some critical race theory, gay identity politics, disability rights projects, indigenous-nationalist 
projects and human rights projects”). 
213. This is a core theme of Mary Anne Franks’ review of Split Decisions: 
 
 A politically viable theory must be critical and contextual; Halley’s desire-as-theory is neither. 
 This is clearest in the way that Halley approaches “pleasure,” and consequently, in the way 
 that she approaches “harm.” To put it bluntly, Halley seems to think that a lack of pleasure, 
 or the loss of an opportunity for pleasure, is, in itself, a harm. This is hedonics indeed; Halley 
 does not concern herself with evaluating pleasures but rather implies that the very fact that 
  someone could take pleasure in something makes that possibility inherently valuable. Simply 
  put: Halley immunizes pleasure from critique. 
 
Franks, supra note 4, at 263. 
214. Although I noted that I was not going to consider the Governance Feminism essays, I’ll cheat 
a little here. In her critique of the ICTY norms criminalizing rape in war, Halley characterizes the 
decisions of women to engage in sex with enemy combatants as choice, solace, pragmatisim, desire, etc. 
Halley, Rape in Berlin, supra note 188. There is nothing “wrong” with her critique, but to me it 
resonates so much more with liberalism’s emphasis on choice and agency, than with a left engagement 
with the background contexts of distribution and power that shape “choice.” Of course, Marx put this 
much better than I: “The slave is the property of a particular master; the worker must indeed sell himself 
to capital, but not to a particular capitalist, and so within certain limitations he may choose to sell 
himself to whomever he wishes; and he may also change his master.” KARL MARX, 1 CAPITAL: A 
CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY app. at 1032 (Ben Fowkes trans., Penguin Classics 1990) (1867). See 
also Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1943) 
(discussing how background political and economic context shape both life options and bargaining 
power, undermining conventional doctrines such as duress). 
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vis-à-vis dinge queens and rice queens, to the fascinating recent studies of how 
black punks and their white daddies negotiated the strictures of racism and 
homophobia in the Jim Crow South, to the need for a compelling analysis of 
Tyrone Garner that defies both the “gay” glorification of the Lawrence v. Texas 
facts as “the gay Loving” and the condemnation of them, as the black police 
officer did, as “unspeakable.”215 (You may recall that it was Garner’s white 
“boyfriend” who instigated the Lawrence litigation when he turned Garner in, 
describing him as “a nigger with a gun” to compel police to rush to find Garner 
in bed with Lawrence.216
In sum, in Halley’s TBF, rather than being historical, contingent, and 
varying, sex appears natural, essential, and fundamentally more “special” than 
(prior to?) other bodily functions and pleasures. It is isolated from real 
economies of distribution, populations, labor, public health. Unlike other labor 
forms, it cannot be regulated. Unlike other social relations, it is amaterial, 
isolated from power and its distributive effects. Unlike other bodily forms and 
practices, i.e., race or religion, it is embraced as natural and crucial to the self, 
thus appearing as ahistorical, pre-social, and beyond the scope of innovation, 
technology, and regulatory inquiry. And finally, her embrace of its “liberation” 
is deeply identitarian, rooted in the sex practiced “by gay men” and the queer 
theory generated “by gay men,” embracing dimorphic gender as stable and 
meaningful. It is exempt from regulation because of its “primality” and its 
repression (and its need for liberation). Sex exceptionalism isolates sex from 
other social relations, networks of exchange and power, and distributive justice 
 This flies in the face of the gay Loving analogy.) In 
Halley’s iteration, how far does a queer theoretic anti-identitarianism go? Can 
identitarian-based critiques be sustained as queer in Halley’s rigorously anti-
identitarian political mode? Does her critique render black queer analysis 
oxymoronic? 
                                                          
215. DAVID L. ENG, THE FEELING OF KINSHIP: QUEER LIBERALISM AND THE RACIALIZATION OF 
INTIMACY 35-37, 40-42 (2010) (citing Dale Carpenter, The Unknown Past of Lawrence v. Texas, 102 
Mich. L. Rev. 1464 (2004)). David Eng and I both resist romanticized readings of Garner’s interracial 
relationship. I have contended that, contra liberal interpretations of interraciality as a “bellwether” of 
racial affection and equality, such relationships can often reinforce and intensify structural subordination 
and power imbalances. I call this the injuries of intimacy. Garner’s racialization by an angry white 
boyfriend, who also sought the assistance of the incarceral state to punish his straying partner, is 
emblematic of this. Davis, Slavery and Shadow Families, supra note 48, at 67. See also ENG, RACIAL 
CASTRATION, supra note 210, at 1 (using psychoanalytic theory to consider interplay of racial and 
sexual formations); RODERICK A. FERGUSON, ABERRATIONS IN BLACK: TOWARD A QUEER OF COLOR 
CRITIQUE ix (2003) (“tell[ing] a story of canonical sociology’s regulation of people like the 
transgendered man, the sissy, and the bulldagger as part of its general regulation of African American 
culture.”); DWIGHT A. MCBRIDE, WHY I HATE ABERCROMBIE AND FITCH: ESSAYS ON RACE AND 
SEXUALITY (2005) (using queer insights to transform terrain of African-American studies as a field); 
BLACK QUEER STUDIES: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY (E. Patrick Johnson & Mae G. Henderson eds., 2005) 
(collection of germinal black queer texts); Jennifer Devere Brody & Dwight A. McBride, Introduction, 
23 CALLALOO 286, 287 (2000) (introducing collection of essays challenging “[the] heterosexist impulse 
in black studies and connect[ing] it to the reigning politics of black authenticity”). 
216. Cf. Carpenter, supra note 215 (giving different accounts of Lawrence and Garner’s arrest to 
show actual facts and motivations remain unclear). 
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inquiries. This seems to be the opposite of what Halley desires for sex in our 
world.217
I fear that Halley’s TBF has placed sex beyond the distributive justice and 
capabilities projects that I know Halley cares deeply about. My closing 
question then is: can sex be part of the same distributive inquiry that we make 
with respect to other central capabilities, i.e., literacy, food, health care, 
shelter—and yet also be recognized for its distinctive traits? And I do mean 
distinctive, not exceptional, in the sense that we recognize the differing 
characteristics of all capabilities. When sex is in play, can we be attentive to the 
distributive consequences of power? In sum, can we move from this 
exceptional view to an understanding of sex occurring within political 
economies, or, what I’ve characterized elsewhere as sexual political 
economies?
 
218
CONCLUSION: SILHOUETTES OF POWER 
 
This Article has used the disparate aesthetic and scholarly projects of Janet 
Halley and Kara Walker to make some observations about the latest wave of 
anti-identitarianism among the left. If the current anti-identitarian zeitgeist is 
about distancing bodies from the material effects history is supposed to inflict 
on them, Walker and Halley have joined it in a powerful way. While among the 
more interesting provocateurs, they are hardly alone in their claims. Other now-
standard moves against justice projects attempt to marginalize the injury, play 
the blame game, or pit some injuries against others. In contrast, Walker and 
Halley root their disputes with conventional civil rights and feminist justice 
projects in their embrace of abjection. 
As I hope this Article has made clear, there is merit to their projects. Both 
seek to shed light on economies of injury and the current flaccidity of identity 
politics. Both challenge us to re-conceive power’s nuance and the body’s 
capacities. They force us to grapple with the liberatory possibilities of shame 
and the fragmented self, versus the dignity-seeking at the heart of most justice 
projects. Yet, this Article has also tried to suggest some limits to their 
provocation, and for Halley in particular, her normative and regulatory claims. 
                                                          
217. I should note that Halley is not alone in sexuality exceptionalism. In a narrower context, labor 
advocate Vicki Schultz too tries to find way to exempt sexuality from regulation in workforce. See 
generally Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061 (2003) (contending that sexual 
harassment law wrongly suppresses sex and intimacy in the workplace). See also Vicki Schultz, 
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1689 (1998) (arguing that sexual 
harassment law should focus on women’s consignment to lesser, gendered work roles, not “sexuality as 
such”). Cf. Romero, supra note 4, at 242 (“Vicki Schultz’s recent work on employment discrimination 
in the form of hostile environment sex harassment illustrates that Halley’s critical stance, and the 
critique of feminist projects she seeks, can be achieved without taking a break from feminism.”). 
218. See supra note 195. 
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Abjection as they articulate it celebrates shame and degradation over 
justice projects’ first principles of equality, anti-subordination, and dignity. If 
justice projects are skeptical of power for its proclivities to violence and group 
subordination, Walker and Halley applaud power as liberatory, particularly in 
sexual contexts. Yet, despite their embrace of these alternative conceptions of 
bodies, both oddly dematerialize sex and power. Slavery’s labor and production 
relations are absent from the moonlight and magnolia representations in 
Walker’s silhouettes, and Halley’s essays about feminist regulation and 
governance rarely discuss “real cases” or the background conditions of the rape 
camps. In both, the abject is dematerialized into a liberation that is deeply 
personal and not at all political. 
This Article performed a brief genealogy of abjection to raise some 
questions about Walker’s and Halley’s claims. It contended that while their 
aesthetic and intellectual invocations of abjection are fascinating, neither 
Kristeva’s psychoanalytic turn nor Bersani’s political one endorses Halley and 
Walker’s embrace of dematerialized economies of bodies and disavowals of 
anti-subordination projects. In particular, Bersani’s notion of abjection, which 
has achieved canonical status in sexuality studies, is an identity and justice 
project, one that rests on material investigations of injury and background 
regimes. 
In addition, for legal scholars in particular, this Article has sought to show 
how, even as we try to escape the perils of identitarianism, we may find 
ourselves in a trap of exceptionalism. Halley is correct that feminism needs to 
account for its own power. All law is governance and feminist law is no 
different, despite its impulses to moralize. Yet Halley goes from a provocative 
and rip-roaring critique of feminism to a claim about sexuality of her own—
that it is sacred, repressed, and in need of liberation from feminist regulation 
and governance. It appears outside of the regulation we apply to markets, 
beyond the efforts to help vulnerable populations, almost Freudian in its 
simultaneous irrationality and necessity for the constitution of the self. And, 
while Halley’s commitments are clearly to the anti-identitarian project, she 
herself falls prey to a deeply essentialist identitarianism as she parses and 
prefers a queer theory made “by men.” 
In the end, I am calling for a new justice project. My hope is to avoid both 
moralizing sex as an identitarian force, which Halley contends feminism does, 
and exceptionalizing it, as I contend Halley does. Must we except sex from 
rigorous attention to distributive economies of justice? I hope not. Instead, 
those committed to proliferating sexual capabilities should give close attention 
to the material and distributive contexts and backgrounds of sex, or sexual 
distributive justice. 
 
